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UNDERSTANDING PROPHYLACTIC REMEDIES THROUGH
THE LOOKING GLASS OF BUSH V. GORE
Tracy A. Thomas*
Using the context of Bush v. Gore as a vehicle for discussion, Professor
Thomas examines the use and legitimacy ofprophylactic remedies. In this Article,
Professor Thomas advances the argument that the broad prophylactic remedy
provided by the U.S. Supreme Courtin Bush v. Gore may be viewed as contraryto
the law of remedies in that it operatedto negate, ratherthan enforce, legal rights.
In particular,prophylactic remedies which are untailoredand unachievable,as in
Bush v. Gore, threaten the legitimacy ofprophylaxis. Professor Thomas argues
that the use ofprophylactic remedies itself is not problematic, but concludes that
misuse of prophylactic powers can lead to the use of arbitraryand unbounded
equitablejudicialpower.

"There's no use trying," she said: "one can't believe impossible
things."
"Idaresayyou haven't hadmuch practice,"saidthe Queen. "When
I was your age, Ialways did itfor half-an-houra day. Why, sometimes
I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast. I
Examining Bush v. Gore' through the looking glass of remedies law reveals an
unusual array of seemingly-impossible legal creatures: Prophylaxis, Unfettered
Equity, Ratcheted Relief, and the Mirage of Prophylactic Effects. This Article
explores these remedial concepts in order to advance a new understanding of
prophylactic remedies and their legitimate use by the courts. Prophylactic remedies,
* Associate Professor, The University of Akron School of Law. This Article began as

a presentation at The Final Arbiter Conference co-sponsored by The University of Akron
School of Law and The Bliss Institute for Political Studies at The University of Akron. A
paper based on my remarks at the conference appears as Bush v. Gore and the Distortion of
Common Law Remedies, in THE FINAL ARBITER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V.
GORE IN LAW AND PoLrrIcs (forthcoming SUNY Press). Thank you to The University of
Akron School of Law for its summer research assistance, and to Stephen Funk, Brant Lee,
Stewart Moritz, Molly O'Brien and Elizabeth Reilly for their comments and suggestions on
the paper. A special thanks to Stuart Baker and Edward Ebling for their excellent research
assistance.
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES INWONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-

GLASS 177 (Roger Lancelyn Green ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1982) (1872).
2 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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which impose additional measures on defendants beyond a mere proscription
against further harm, are often criticized as illegitimate judicial rulemaking.
However, as this Article will demonstrate, prophylactics are remedies and not rules,
and thus, fall within the court's accepted power to remedy legal harms.
Prophylactic remedies properly used provide the courts with alternative means to
enforce important constitutional and statutory rights.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore facilitates this understanding of
prophylactic remedies by demonstrating their legitimacy as well as their potential
misuse. Commentators have quickly dismissed the remedial decision in Bush v.
Gore as impossible under the law3 and instead have explained the outcome by other
ulterior legal or political motives." Rather than focusing on what the Supreme Court
should or could have done, this Article examines the actual text of the decision and
the validity of its remedial analysis. Because the platform of remedies law enabled
the Court to achieve consensus in this highly-charged dispute, it is the remedial
decision that may have long-term impact upon the law.5 Like Alice at the end of the
' Ward Farnsworth, "To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A User's Guide to
Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 227 (2001) (concluding that the Court's

remedial decision was "lawless" in that it "lacked an adequate legal foundation by traditional
standards"); Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-HalfCheersfor Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHIC.

L. REV. 657, 674 (2001) (finding the Court's remedial decision "troubling" and incorrect as
a matter of law); Richard A. Posner, Florida2000: A Legal and StatisticalAnalysis of the
Election Deadlock and the EnsuingLitigation,2000 SuP. CT. REV. 1,48 (arguing the equal

protection remedy had a "gotcha!" flavor of nailing the Florida court but providing no relief
to Florida voters); David A. Strauss, Nat Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE
& THE SUPREME COURT 184, 187 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) ("What
does seem indefensible is the Court's remedy"); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 767 (2001) (calling the Bush v. Gore remedy a "blunder," as well as the
most difficult part of the Court's opinion to defend on conventional legal grounds). But see
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1219,

1270-76 (2002) (defending the controversial remedial decision of the Bush Court).
4 ALAN DERSHOWlTZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HUACKED ELECTION

2000, at 110, 121-72 (2001) (suggesting the decision was motivated by personal political
agendas of individual Supreme Court Justices); Farnsworth, supranote 3, at 230 (suggesting
the decision was motivated by structural inter-branch policy concerns); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphiosfor NeutralPrinciplesin ConstitutionalLaw.: Bush v. Gore
and the Emerging Jurisprudenceof Oprah!, 90 GEO. L. J. 2087 (2002) (suggesting the
decision was motivated by the subjective moral commitments of individual Justices to a
particular result rather than stare decisis); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standardsand Bush v.
Gore: Form and the Law ofDemocracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L: REV. 65 (2002) (suggesting
the decision was motivated by jurisprudential choice between rules and standards); Strauss,
supra note 3, at 187 (suggesting the decision was motivated by a perceived need to curtail
the partisanship of the Florida Supreme Court).
' Thus, as Professor Mark Tushnet has suggested, this Article seeks to renormalize the
post-Bush v. Gore law by working out the doctrinal implications of the Court's innovations
rather than simply dismissing the case as a political anomaly. Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing
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dream, lawyers will awaken and realize that Bush v. Gore provides important
principles of law to guide them in future adventures in the legal wonderland.6
As the Article will explain, Bush v. Gore represents an unprecedented use of a
broad prophylactic remedy designed to prevent future harm by imposing required
precautions addressing conduct ancillary to the proven harm. In response to the
Florida court's arbitrary treatment of voters in the manual recount, the Bush Court
imposed numerous mandatory standards and procedures ancillary to any further
recount. 7 This use of a prophylactic remedy by the Bush Court is not in itself
problematic. Prophylaxis has unfairly become the miscreant ofjudicial action.8 But
contrary to common perception, prophylaxis is simply one type of remedy
legitimately imposed by a court to redress a proven harm.
Courts, however, can misuse prophylactic remedies. The Bush Court's
imposition of a prophylactic remedy that was unachievable, untailored, and
unnecessary is such an example of the misuse of the remedy. The Court's decision
to impose the prophylactic remedy arbitrarily departed from previously-existing
standards constraining the use of this powerful remedy. Perhaps for the first time,
the Supreme Court used its flexible equity power, ostensibly designed to achieve
justice and fairness, to do harm rather than good. By prohibiting all recounts that
did not comply with the new complex system, the Supreme Court nullified the state
right to a voting remedy and created further equal protection harm by denying relief
to those Florida voters who cast a legal vote which was not counted. 9 The Court's
application of the prophylactic remedy in the context of the voting dispute thus
worked to bar rather than provide effective relief for the constitutional and state law
violations. This was the fundamental failing of the remedial decision in Bush v.
Gore because the law of remedies should be used to enforce rather than negate
legal rights.
Part I of this Article discusses the decision in Bush v. Gore under the
microscope of remedies law. It reveals how the Court's decision to impose
Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEo. L.J. 113, 118-19 (2001).
6 "So I wasn't dreaming, after all," she said to herself, "unless - unless we're all
part of the same dream. Only I do hope it's my dream, and not the Red King's!
I don't like belonging to another person's dream," she went on in a rather
complaining tone: "I've a great mind to go and wake him, and see what
happens!"
CARROLL,

supra note 1, at 209.

Y Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109-10 (requiring the adoption of statewide standards,
procedures to implement them, and judicial review).
8 See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text. Prophylactic relief is claimed to be
illegitimate because it is judicial regulation of conduct that itself does not violate the law.
Accordingly, it is argued that prophylaxis is an abuse ofjudicial power that overprotects legal
rights. But as this Article will explain, both of these criticisms are unfounded.
9 See infra notes 108-10, 326 and accompanying text.
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prophylactic relief for the Florida court's violation of equal protection was an
unusual application of prophylaxis that ordered too much, rather than too little,
relief. Part H explains the legitimacy and precedential effect of prophylactic
remedies. By highlighting the remedial rather than rule-like nature of prophylaxis,
the Article demonstrates that prophylactic remedies are an important and acceptable
use ofjudicial power. However, as discussed in Part Il, prophylactic remedies can
be misused when imposed unnecessarily and crafted inappropriately. This Article
illustrates how the Bush Court misused the prophylactic remedy and thereby
endorsed the use of arbitrary and unbounded equitable judicial power. This result,
which one would have expected to be impossible from the current Court, given its
reputation as both conservative and committed to the concept of judicial restraint,
is one that will keep remedies law in wonderland for the near future.
I. THE REMEDIAL DECISION OF BUSH V. GORE
The Bush v. Gore decision has been mistakenly characterized as an anomalous
voting case. However, the decision's true focus and actual content center on the
law of remedies. The question presented in Bush v. Gore was the constitutionality
of the recount remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court to rectify the
violations of state law caused by the exclusion of legal votes from the tabulation.
In a tripartite remedial decision, the Bush Court invalidated the state remedy,
imposed its own prophylactic remedy, and prohibited the effectuation of any
remedy.
The Bush Court began its decision by holding that the Florida recount remedy
for the tabulation error violated equal protection." Seven Justices agreed with the
determination that the Florida remedy violated equal protection; however, only five
Justices agreed with the two remedial decisions that followed." Rather than simply
prohibiting the unconstitutional recount, the majority of five held that the necessary
remedy to cure the unconstitutional state action was an injunction requiring the
Florida state court to adopt additional standards and procedures for a recount. 2
Then, the Court held that state law required that any appropriate recount remedy be
completed by the safe harbor date of December 12."3 Since the Court issued its
remedial decision on December 12, the injunction could not possibly have been
implemented by the Florida court. As a result, the Court's imposition of a
prophylactic remedy effectively denied any relief for either the state election law
Bush v. Gore, 530 U.S. at 105-09.
Id.at 111.
2 Id. at 109-10.
'3 Id. at 110. Federal election law establishes a "safe harbor date" that provides that all
state electoral votes submitted to Congress by that date will be unchallenged. 3 U.S.C. § 5
(2000).
0
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or federal constitutional violations by ratcheting up the remedy to a level impossible
to achieve due to time and complexity. Each of these three aspects of the Court's
remedial decision is examined more fully in the following discussion.
A. The State Remedy Violates Equal Protection
The United States Supreme Court first concluded that the Florida recount
remedy violated equal protection. The Florida Supreme Court found a violation of
the contest provision of its state election law' 4 based on the failure of several
counties to count "a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the
result of the election."'" To remedy this tabulation error, the Florida Supreme Court
issued an injunction including the vote totals from previous protest recounts and
ordering a statewide manual recount in all other counties with undervotes, which
was to be supervised by one trial judge.'6 The Florida Supreme Court determined
that the recounts would be governed by the standard for determining a "legal vote"
established by the state legislature, which was that a vote shall be counted as legal
"if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter."' 7 The U.S. Supreme Court
found that this state injunction violated equal protection because it failed to adopt
specific uniform standards for the recount."' The Supreme Court held that the
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West 2000) (amended 2001).
"5Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla.) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c)
(West 2000) (amended 2001)), revd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per
curiam).
6 Id. at 1262. Florida law provided two time frames and processes by which to challenge
the validity of vote tabulation. A "protest" claim was to be brought before the county
canvassing boards and occurred prior to certification of the electoral votes by the Secretary
of State. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West 2000) (amended 2001). The "contest" phase
occurred in court after the certification. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West 2000) (amended
2001). Gore raised claims in both of these phases. The protest challenge resulted in the Bush
v. PalmBeach County CanvassingBoarddecisionsin the Florida and United States Supreme
Courts and the Siegel v. LePore decisions in the federal courts. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd.v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.) (per curiam), vacatedpercuriam sub nom.
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, per curiam on remand, 772 So.
2d 1273 (Fla. 2000); Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla.), aff'dper curiam,
234 F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir. 2000). The contest litigation resulted in the Gore v. Harris
decisions. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'dper curiam sub nom.
Bush v.Gore, 531 U.S. 98, reliefdeniedpercuriam on remand,773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000).
" Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1256 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West 2000)
(amended 2001)).
" Ironically, the equal protection issue had been presented to the Supreme Court several
times by Bush in his petitions for certiorari in the protest litigation in Siegel v. LePore, 234
F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), and Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard v.
Harris,772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.) (per curiam), vacatedper curiam sub nom. Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). Bush argued that the Florida statutes
14
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Florida remedy endorsed and authorized the use of arbitrary standards in the countyby-county recount process because, for example, a hanging chad was counted in one
county as a legal vote, but excluded in another. 9 Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing
that the appointment of the single trial judge to oversee the recount process sufficed
to ensure uniform standards," ° but the majority held that specific standards should
have been ordered by the Florida court.2
The U.S. Supreme Court's foray into the validity of a state remedy for a state
law violation is unusual in and of itself. Indeed, there are few cases in which the
Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of state court remedies for state
law violations. One rare example is Mitchum v. Foster,22 in which the Supreme
Court invalidated on First Amendment grounds an injunction issued by a Florida
state court closing down an obscene bookstore for violating state nuisance law.23
While the Supreme Court has reviewed state court remedies for violations of federal
rights24 and federal court remedies for violations of state rights related to federal
claims,2" it has rarely examined the conduct of state courts issuing remedies for state
law violations.2 6 And that is all that was present in the initial case. Bush v. Gore
began simply as a case of a state court issuing a remedy for a state election law
violation caused by technical vote tabulation errors.27
permitting protest manual recounts violated equal protection and due process, in part,
because they failed to include specific uniform standards for initiating and conducting manual
recounts. The Court, however, declined to address the equal protection issue until it was
raised again as an afterthought in Bush v. Gore. The equal protection claim is the last of
three claims raised by Bush in his petition for certiorari in Bush v. Gore and his merits brief
devotes only six of fifty pages to the issue. See Brief for Petitioners at 40-45, Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (focusing equal protection argument primarily on
selectivity claim, i.e., that it was unconstitutional to permit recounts in only selective

counties).
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000) (per curiam).
20 Id. at 123-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21
22

Id. at 106-07.
407 U.S. 225 (1972).

23 Id.
24

E.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bev., 496 U.S. 18 (1990) (reviewing

injunction issued by Florida state court prohibiting state beverage tax that violated federal
Commerce Clause). For a discussion of McKesson, see infra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text.
25 E.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357,367-68 (1997) (reviewing federal
court injunction restricting place and manner of abortion protests issued to prevent violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c, and state trespass law).
26 Cf, Fortson.v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 242 (1967) (reversing federal court remedy for
alleged federal constitutional violation caused by a state constitutional provision allowing
legislature to choose the governor in the absence of an electoral majority).
27 Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1187 (11 th Cir. 2000) (Anderson, J., concurring); see
also Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796,802 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that human errors resulting
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Indeed, Supreme Court examination of state court remedies generally is futile
because the Court lacks the power under the Anti-Injunction Act 28 to order any

change in the state court. The Anti-Injunction Act, originally enacted in 1793,29
prohibits any federal court, including the Supreme Court, from granting an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court, including all remedial and
enforcement proceedings. 3' The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
Act is not a mere discretionary principle of comity or abstention, 3 but rather is an
absolute prohibition against federal equitable intervention in a pending state court
proceeding, regardless of how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be.32
One of the narrow statutory exceptions to this absolute ban is when Congress has
expressly authorized the injunction, as for example with 42 U.S.C. § 1983
authorizing injunctive relief to redress constitutional harms committed by state
actors. 3 Arguably, this exception may have permitted the Supreme Court's
intervention in Bush v. Gore as it did in Mitchum where the claim was made that a
state judicial actor violated the Constitution.34 However, unlike past cases where
in the miscounting of votes and other voting errors presented only an issue of state law for
which adequate state remedies existed); Powell v. Power, 436 F:2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1970)
(holding that voting errors in federal congressional primary did not present issue of federal
law).
28

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).

29 Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
30 28 U.S.C. § 2283; Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
3 There are also abstention principles that guide a federal

U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
court's discretion as to when
it should avoid interpreting state law. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)
(holding that federal court should not intervene in complex state administrative processes
involving state law with substantial public policy implications); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal court will defer to state court resolution
of underlying issues of state law where state law issue is unsettled and dispositive in the
case). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Siegel v. LePore
that neither of these abstention doctrines precluded the federal court from considering issues
of Florida state law regarding manual recounts. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1173.
32 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
31 28 U.S.C. § 2283; Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242-43.
14 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 227; see also Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) (holding
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar federal court from enjoining Indiana statutory recount
procedure administered by state court in congressional election because the court was
performing a nonjudicial function under state law); Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11 th Cir.
1995) (holding that a federal court had the power to issue an injunction preventing
compliance with a state court remedy ordering inclusion of votes from erroneous absentee
ballots where the remedy violated federal constitutional rights). Additionally, even where
federal intervention is not prohibited, the Court will generally abstain from enjoining state
court proceedings in a civil case absent some great and immediate irreparable harm or
flagrant violation of the Constitution by the state, both of which arguably were satisfied in
the Bush v. Gorecase. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,611-12 (1975). However,
Bush's petition for certiorari does not mention § 1983, and the Court has held that the
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the Court has authorized an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Bush Court
did not engage in any detailed discussion justifying its intervention. Rather, it
ignored the issue altogether."
B. The ProphylacticRemedy for the Constitutional Violation
After making the unusual decision to review the state court remedy,the
Supreme Court then took a second novel step of insisting that only broad injunctive
relief would remedy the equal protection violation and protect against future
violations. The Bush Court ordered myriad standards and procedures as
constitutionally necessary for any recount to protect against further arbitrary
treatment.36 A majority of five Justices expressly held a "recount cannot be
conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process
without substantial additional work" that builds in the constitutionally "necessary
safeguards" to protect the right to vote. 7 The inability to comply with these
measures was a foregone conclusion. Thus, contrary to popular opinion, the Court
in Bush v. Gore did not order too little relief, but rather too much.
The Court's decision created a process for designing and implementing a
manual recount. 8 The additional constitutionally required safeguards according to
the Bush majority were:
1. "[T]he adoption (after opportunity for argument) of adequate statewide
standards for determining what is a legal vote";39
2. "[P]racticable procedures to implement [the standards]"; 4"
3. "[O]rderly judicial review of any disputed matters that might arise"; 4 and
4. Evaluation of the accuracy of vote tabulation equipment by the Florida
Secretary of State.42
The Court also acknowledged concerns over the identity and qualification of those
designated to recount, implying that some of the mandated practical procedures
should address the issue of the persons in charge of the recount.43 Additionally, the
congressional authorization exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is not satisfied when the
complaint fails to rely upon or mention § 1983 even where it alleges constitutional violations.
County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54, 60 n.4 (1980).
" Gore also failed to raise the Anti-Injunction issue in his briefs. See Brief of
Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949).
36 See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
3 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
38 Id.
39 id.

40 Id.

Id.
Id.
43 Id. at 109 (noting additional concerns raised by the Florida court's order, as it failed
to specify who would recount the ballots, prohibited observers from objecting during the
41
42
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Court suggested that a proper recount should include overvotes, those ballots
indicating a vote for two persons, as well as undervotes, those in which no vote for
President was mechanically recorded."
This type of court order proscribing a code of conduct tangential to the illegal
conduct is called a prophylactic injunction. 5 The addition of tangential,
precautionary measures is the defining characteristic of prophylactic relief, which
distinguishes it from other injunctions that simply prohibit further illegal action or
repair the consequences of the past harm.46 The term itself derives from the Greek
word prophylaktikos meaning "to take precautions against" or "to keep guard
before."47 It is used in medicine to mean supplemental measures such as
vaccinations or prescriptions given to prevent disease or other untoward results.48
recount, and forced county canvassing boards to pull together ad hoc teams ofjudges with
no previous training in handling and interpreting ballots); see also Lund, supra note 3
(providing an excellent discussion and explanation of case facts and holding inFlorida and
federal courts).
4 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
4 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 272 (2d ed. 1994) (defining
prophylactic relief as a type of reparative relief ordering additional precautions designed to

prevent future harm or the future consequences of past harm); ELAINE W. SHOBEN &
WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 246 (2d ed. 1995) ("[A]

prophylactic injunction seeks to safeguard the plaintiff's rights by directing the defendant's
behavior so as to minimize the chance that wrongs might recur in the future.").
4' DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 131-34 (3d ed. 2002);
SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 45, at 246 ("[V]iolation of a prophylactic injunction is not
necessarily a legal wrong in itself, except that the injunction makes it so.. . ."); David
Schoenbrod, The Measureof an Injunction:A Principleto Replace Balancingthe Equities
and Tailoringthe Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 678-79 (1988) (describing special type

of injunction that "aims for the plaintiffs rightful position, but to achieve that aim, its terms
may impose conditions on the defendant that require actions going beyond the plaintiff's
rightful position."). Understanding that prophylactic modifies the noun injunction by
expanding its meaning answers critics who avoid defining prophylactic as a preventive
remedy. Brian K. Landsberg, SafeguardingConstitutionalRights: The Uses and Limits of
Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 927 n.6 (1999) (stating that prophylactic

"measures have also been called 'preventive remedial,' but that phrase seems too limited
because it sounds like ordinary preventive relief, aimed directly at the core violation rather
than at risk").

41 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

DICTIONARY 644 (2d ed. 1989).
48 DORLAND'S MEDICALDICTIONARY

1406 (4th ed. 2000); XII OXFORD ENGLISH

1364 (28th ed. 1994) (defining "prophylactic" as
"an agent that tends to ward off disease"); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK
DICTIONARY (1993) (defining "prophylactic" as "guarding from or preventing the spread or
occurrence of disease or infection"); MOSBY'S DICTIONARY 1284 (4th ed. 1994) (defining
"prophylactic" as a biologic, chemical, or mechanical agent that prevents the spread of
disease). For example, patients with artificial hips are given prophylactic antibiotics prior
to an invasive surgery such as dental surgery to prevent an infection in the artificial joint. See
THE MERCK MANUAL 748 (17th ed. 1999). And of course the word is commonly used in the
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Similarly, prophylactic measures in law describe measures ordered as supplements
to the defendant's normal conduct to avoid future legal harm. These measures, now
mandated by the court, convert previously legal conduct into prohibited conduct by
virtue of the injunctive remedy backed by the court's contempt power.49 In this
way, it is commonly said that prophylactic relief "sweeps broadly to require
additional measures that are not themselves illegal." 50
A classic example of prophylactic relief is the injunction issued in sexual
harassment cases."1 These orders typically include enumerated measures ordering
the creation of new employment policies, requiring employee training, and
mandating grievance procedures for future incidents.52 Such an injunction sweeps
wide to include within its mandate legitimate activity of employment policies and
procedures as preventive measures to protect against future illegal harassment and
remedy the past harm. 3 The policies and procedures themselves are not requi red
by law, but are included in the prophylactic remedy as supplemental measures to
protect against future harassment that is difficult to eradicate by simply ordering:
54
"Do not harass."
vernacular to mean a device to prevent an undesired pregnancy. AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1406 (4th ed. 2000). I would like to thank Dr. Fred Thomas, M.D., and Dr.
Paula Renker, Ph.D., R.N., for their assistance and medical insights as to the medical use of
the term "prophylactic."
41 SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 45, at 246.
50 SCHOENBROD, supra note 46, at 131; see also City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
"' See LAYCOCK, supra note 45; SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 45, at 246.
52 E.g., EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding
injunctive relief ordering creation of anti-harassment policy and grievance procedure to
prevent against the possibility of future harm); Women Prisoners v. District ofColumbia, 877
F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (ordering creation of new anti-harassment policy, training for
employees and prisoners, adoption of grievance procedures, and appointment of special
master to investigate complaints), rev'd in part,93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (overturning
order appointing special master), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997); Neal v. Dir., D.C.
Dep't of Corr., 1995 WL 517244, at *2 (D.D.C. 1995) (establishing a new, independent
office to be responsible for investigation and resolution of complaints, training, and other
issues related to sexual harassment and retaliation); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n,
766 F. Supp. 1052, 1080 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (remedying sexual harassment by ordering the
creation of an anti-harassment policy, grievance procedures, and an education program);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 948 (D.D. C. 1981) (ordering anti-harassment policy and
grievance procedures); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Iowa 1990)
(affirming court's order that city develop police department-wide education and training in
prevention and correction of sexual harassment).
" Schoenbrod, supra note 46, at 678-79.
14 Neal, 1995 WL 517244, at *2 (imposing expansive prophylactic measures because
mandatory prohibition of sexual harassment of female guards ordered fourteen years earlier
had failed to prevent harassment); Sims, 766 F. Supp. at 1080 (imposing an order prohibiting
further sexual harassment against female officers, but recognizing that a prohibitory
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The Supreme Court has imposed prophylactic relief in a variety of cases. 5 For
example, in Hutto v. Finney,56 the Supreme Court prohibited an Arkansas prison
from imposing punitive isolation upon prisoners beyond thirty days, even though
it found that the isolation itself did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 7 The
majority found that lengthy isolation contributed to other problems that did violate
the Constitution and thus restricted the contributing cause as a prophylactic
remedy. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist correctly, albeit pejoratively, labeled
this action prophylactic because the Court was imposing an additional measure
upon the defendants beyond the actual law. In another example, Madsen v.
Women's Health Center,6" the Supreme Court upheld an injunction prohibiting
injunction is inadequate to address the sexual harassment in the department, and therefore
further requiring the defendant to "take affirmative steps to rid the department of its current
sexually hostile atmosphere").
" E.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) ("[T]he Anders procedure is not 'an
independent constitutional command,' but rather is just 'a prophylactic framework' that we
established to vindicate the constitutional right to appellate counsel announced inDouglas.");
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (upholding prohibitions of
attorney solicitation as "prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm
before it occurs"); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (requiring prison authorities
to "assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law"
to protect right of access to courts) (citation omitted); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S.
145, 155-56 (1965) (upholding a reporting requirement so "that the court might be informed
as to whether the old discriminatory practices really had been abandoned"); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963) (affirming a "mild" prophylactic
injunction of requiring a fiduciary to disclose to clients his own dealings in recommended
securities before and after the issuance of recommendations in order to prevent securities
fraud). For examples of prophylactic remedies imposed by lower federal courts, see Ruiz v.
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding a decree containing prophylactic measures
requiring a prison to: file reports on the number of inmates and space per inmate; reduce its
overall inmate population; provide each inmate confined in a dormitory with forty square feet
of space; preserve a verbatim record of all disciplinary hearings; give inmates in
administrative segregation the opportunity for regular exercise; and allow inmates access to
courts, counsel, and public officials); Women Prisoners v. District ofColumbia, 968 F. Supp.
744, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1997) (imposing prophylactic measures to prevent sexual harassment
and assaults of women inmates).
56

437 U.S. 678 (1978).

7 Id. at 687.
58 Id. at 686-88 (holding that lengthy time in punitive isolation where inmates were
subjected to violence, severe overcrowding and inadequate diet of "grue" would be
unconstitutional).
" Id. at 712 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the prophylactic
action was inappropriate because it was "not remedial in the sense that it 'restore[s] the
victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in, the absence
of such conduct."' Id. (alteration in original).
60 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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abortion protestors from standing within thirty-six feet of the clinic and restricting
the noise level of the protests." While standing close to the clinic and making loud
noise were not illegal, the Court prohibited these actions as additional remedial
measures to prevent future violations of constitutional and state rights.62 In several
desegregation cases, the Court imposed additional requirements of teacher training,
busing, and increased taxes in order to prevent future racial discrimination in
schools.63 The Court has also imposed a variety of prophylactic measures in the
criminal context to protect against future violations of the right to counsel and the
right against self-incrimination.6 In all of these cases, the Supreme Court has
required practical, tangible action by the defendants as an extra precaution designed
to prevent the recurrence of harm.
The Supreme Court also has used the term prophylactic to describe legislative
or administrative action regulating conduct that is tangentially connected to illegal
action.65 In particular, the Court has utilized this same definition of prophylactic to
describe Congress's remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.66 Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce constitutional rights
Id.at 764-65; see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997)
(upholding a prophylactic injunction ordering a fixed buffer zone around an abortion clinic
in which protests were prohibited).
62 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
63 E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (ordering remedial education, teacher
training, and increased taxes for schools to remedy future effects of racial segregation in
education); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57-58 (1990) (upholding federal court's remedial
power to require a school district to levy taxes to fund school desegregation); Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 287-88 (1977) (ordering remedial education, teacher training, and student
counseling to remedy future effects ofpast racial discrimination); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding a remedy for racial segregation that included quotas,
zoning, and busing in order to address contributing causes of residential segregation).
64 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (mandating process to avoid a harsher
sentence on resentencing after a successful appeal); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) (adopting procedure governing withdrawal of counsel to protect a defendant's right
to counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police warnings to protect
against a criminal suspect's right against self-incrimination).
65 E.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 307 (2001) (describing administrative
regulations that provide measures to eliminate workplace discrimination as "prophylactic");
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000) (describing the "prophylactic" approach of a
Colorado statute designed to protect against future harm); United States v. O'Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997) (upholding securities regulation as valid "prophylactic" measure
enacted pursuant to SEC's statutory authority to use "means reasonably designed to prevent"
fraudulent trading).
66 Thus, Justice Scalia is incorrect in his assertion that the Court's power under a
prophylactic justification goes far beyond what it has permitted Congress to do under the
authority of Section 5. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 460 (2000); cf Paul G.
Cassell, The PathsNot Taken: The Supreme Court'sFailuresin Dickerson,99 MICH. L. REV.
898, 916 (2001) ("[T]he most glaring deficiency is the latitude that the Court has given itself
61
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by appropriate action.67 As I discussed at length in Congress' Section 5 Powerand
RemedialRights,the Court, beginning with City ofBoerne v. Flores,has interpreted
Congress's Section 5 power as authorizing prophylactic remedies for constitutional
violations." In explaining prophylactic relief, the Court stated "Congress' power
'to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter
violations ofrights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath
'
of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."69
Thus, in the Section 5 context, the Supreme Court has applied the definition of a
prophylactic judicial remedy to circumscribe the legislative remedial power.7"
This same concept of prophylactic relief describes the remedy imposed by the
Court in Bush v. Gore.7 Ordinarily, the remedy for an equal protection violation
would be an injunction prohibiting arbitrary treatment or requiring uniform
treatment.72 However, in Bush v. Gore, the Court determined that the only
in promulgating constitutional 'rules' as opposed to the constraints it has imposed on
Congress, an ostensibly co-equal branch of government.").
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
68 Tracy A. Thomas, Congress'Section5 Powerand Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 673, 722-33 (2001).

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); see also City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) ("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process
it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres
of autonomy previously reserved to the States."') (citation omitted); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 213 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
These decisions indicate that congressional prohibition of some conduct which
may not itself violate the Constitution is "appropriate" legislation "to enforce"
the Civil War Amendments if that prohibition is necessary to remedy prior
constitutional violations by the governmental unit, or if necessary to effectively
prevent purposeful discrimination by a governmental unit.
70 Thomas, supra note 68, at 722-28; Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The
Reaffirmation of ProportionalityAnalysis Under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment,
21 CARDozo L. REV. 469 (1999). But see Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate"Means-Ends
Constrainson Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) (arguing that the scope of
Section 5 power should be defined in the same way as other legislative powers which are
"necessary and proper"); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique,
Morrison, and the FutureofAntidiscriminationLaw, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 134 n. 105
(questioning why legislative power should be defined by reference to judicial power).
71 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
72 See Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal
Protectionfrom Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1363 (2001); Susan
P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEo. L.J. 1355, 1360 (1991)
(noting that traditionally the negative injunction has been the remedy of choice and that
courts derive the content of the injunction from the wrongful conduct that is the basis for the
defendants' liability).
69
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appropriate remedy to prevent future constitutional violations from vote recounts
was a prophylactic injunction that mandated a system of standards, procedures, and
review to protect the right to vote.7 3 It rejected the four dissenting Justices'
arguments that a simple injunction either prohibiting arbitrary recounts or
mandating uniform recounts would suffice.7 4 The actual measures adopted by the
Court ratcheted up the required remedy for the constitutional violation to a level
that was impractical, if not impossible, to achieve.
First, the prophylactic remedy was impossible to effectuate because the Florida
court was required to adopt a uniform standard of a legal vote that it may have been
without authority to define. While the Bush majority expressly stated that it was not
necessary to decide whether the Florida Supreme Court had the authority under the
legislative scheme to define a legal vote, Justice Rehnquist argued in his
concurrence that Article II precluded such judicial definition.75 Section 1 of Article
11 of the U.S. Constitution provides that each state shall appoint electors for
President "in such Manner as the Legislaturethereof may direct,"76 and Rehnquist
argued that it prevented the Florida court from defining the standard of a "legal
vote" differently from the legislature or the executive agencies to whom the
legislature had statutorily delegated such responsibility.77 This same caution to the
Florida court against changing or redefining state election law as provided by the
legislature was intimated by a unanimous Supreme Court in its opinion in Bush v.
Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard,which presented the question of whether
the state court impermissibly changed the state laws in the protest litigation in
violation of due process or Article 11.7 Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court
followed this command not to change Florida election law by conforming its
recount order to the existing statutory definition of the "intent of the voter., 79 The
contrary action ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court in its prophylactic remedy thus
potentially ordered the Florida courts to violate federal law.
3 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
See id. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of remand to courts of
Florida with instructions to establish uniform standards for evaluating several types ofballots
that have prompted different treatments to be applied within and among counties); id. at
146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the "Court crafts a remedy out of proportion to
the asserted harm," whereas the appropriate remedy is remand to recount all undervotes with
a single uniform standard); id. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, assuming a
constitutional violation, "the appropriate course of action would be to remand to allow more
specific procedures for implementing the legislature's uniform general standard to be
established").
7 Id. at 105, 118-19 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
7 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 114, 118.
78 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per
curiam).
7' Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1256-57, 1262 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'dpercuriam
sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
74
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court created an impossible remedy by mandating
the involvement of multiple actors in the creation of a judicial recount remedy."0
This significantly increased the transaction costs of imposing the remedy and
directly contravened the Florida legislature's decision to provide the statejudiciary
with the sole discretion to redress and prevent election violations.8 Moreover, the
imposition of a complex series oflegislative-type procedures of notice and comment
and expert agency input, combined with the time constraints of any election much
less a presidential election, made it unlikely that any such recount remedy could be
implemented. The Supreme Court thus created too much relief by imposing a series
of procedures and mandates that could not practically be accomplished.
As Judge Shaw of the Florida Supreme Court stated in the subsequent decision
dismissing the state case:
I am not convinced that additional safeguards could have been
formulated that would have satisfied the United States Supreme Court.
Given the tenor of the opinion in Bush v. Gore... I do not believe that
the Florida Supreme Court could have crafted a remedy under these
circumstances that would have met the due process, equal protection,
and other concerns of the United States Supreme Court."
Perhaps, as Judge Shaw suggests, the Supreme Court engaged in a disingenuous
attempt to provide meaningful relief for the constitutional violation by ordering this
ratcheted-up relief to preclude manual recounts. It is clear, however, that the
Supreme Court used prophylactic relief in an unprecedented way in this case. The
Court used the prophylactic measures as burdensome impediments to bar actual
relief rather than as protective measures providing additional relief for the harm.
C. Using the Remedy to Nullify Rights
The final problematic aspect of the Court's remedial decision in Bush v. Gore
was that it interpreted state law to preclude any attempt to effectuate the ordered
prophylactic measures.83 In this third part of the remedial decision, the Court
The recount standards and procedures ordered by the Bush Courtseems to contemplate
participation by the parties, their lawyers, all interested parties, the state executive, the
counties, the judicial hierarchy, political parties, and technical experts. See Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. at 108-11.
81 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (2000) (amended 2001). The Florida legislature has
since deleted this provision granting the court such discretion to determine the appropriate
relief to cure the election harm. Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 2001-40, § 44 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168) (effective Jan. 1, 2002).
82 Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 529 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., concurring).
83 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110-11.
80
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concluded that Florida law required any recount remedy to be completed by
December 12, the safe harbor date established by 3 U.S.C. § 5 for a state to submit
its electoral votes to Congress without challenge. 4 Since Florida could not
accomplish a recount with all of the required prophylactic measures by the deadline
(the very day of the Supreme Court's decision), the Court prohibited any recount
from proceeding. 5 As a result, there was no remedy for the state election violation
and no remedy for the violation of equal protection.
In Bush v. Gore, the majority made the unprecedented move of rendering its
own interpretation of state law, which proved to be the death knell for any
meaningful remedy. Section 102.168(8) of the Florida election law authorized the
state court to "fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary... to prevent or
correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under the
circumstances. 8 6 The U.S. Supreme Court boldly concluded that "appropriate"
relief under this state law could not include votes counted after December 12.7 The
Court supported its conclusion by arguing that the Florida Supreme Court
previously stated that the safe harbor date of December 12 established by federal
law must be met and that any later action contemplated a violation of the Florida
Election Code. 8
However, nothing in the Florida election statutes mandates compliance with the
safe harbor provision.89 While the Florida court indicated in its opinion addressing
the protest recounts that the Secretary had discretion to ignore amended recount
returns not submitted in time for the December 12 deadline,9" it did not consider the
relative priority of the December 12 goal as compared to the goal of concluding a
thorough contest recount in its decision ordering the statewide recount.9 Only two
84

Id. at 110.

85

Id.

§ 102.168(8) (2000) (amended 2001).
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
88 Id. at 110-11.
s Jeb Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse., in BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY 25-26 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (explaining that the December 12 deadline
was not established by Florida statutory or case law and that the Bush majority simply made
it up).
90 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239-40 (Fla.) (per
curiam), vacatedpercuriamsub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70 (2000); see also Lund, supra note 3, at 1274 n.172 (noting that West Publishing Co.
provided an incorrect citation, leading some to mistakenly believe the Supreme Court offered
a nonsensical citation for an important proposition in its opinion).
", Farnsworth, supranote 3, at 231; Strauss, supra note 3, at 188. Moreover, the Florida
Supreme Court in Gorev. Harris,the subsequent case addressing the contest recount, seemed
to reject the use of a deadline to resolve the dispute. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243,
1261 (Fla.) (per curiam) (noting that, "although the time constraints are limited, we must do
everything required by law to ensure that legal votes that have not been counted are included
86 FLA. STAT. ANN.
87
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dissenting Floridajudges suggested that December 12 was a mandatory deadline for
the contest conclusion.9 2 Moreover, two other Florida judges rejected December 12
as a deadline, and they, as well as several U.S. Supreme Court Justices, suggested
December 18 or even January 6 as operative dates.93 The deadline is significant
because a later date might have allowed the recount remedy to be implemented even
under the U.S. Supreme Court's ratcheted-up standard.94 The Bush majority's foray
into state law, however, precluded the imposition of any recount remedy determined
by the state court to be necessary to remedying the harm.
More fundamentally, the Supreme Court's ruling on the safe harbor date
violates a bedrock principle that the Court does not have authority to render
opinions solely on the basis of state law. 9 For over one hundred and twenty-five
years, the Supreme Court has steadfastly held that it cannot interpret issues of state

in the final election results") (citation omitted), rev'dpercuriam sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000); id. at 1261 n.21:
The dissents would have us throw up our hands and say that because of looming
deadlines and practical difficulties we should give up any attempt to have the
election of the presidential electors rest upon the vote of Florida citizens as
mandated by the Legislature. While we agree that practical difficulties may well
end up controlling the outcome of the election we vigorously disagree that we
should therefore abandon our responsibility to resolve this election dispute under
the rule of law.
See also Sunstein, supra note 3, at 767 (suggesting that the Florida court's prior opinions
indicated a choice of inclusion of votes over the safe harbor date).
9 Justice Wells assumed that the majority would recognize a need to protect the votes of
Florida's presidential electors under 3 U.S.C. § 5, and that therefore, all recounts must be
completed by December 12. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1243, 1268 (Wells, J., dissenting). Justice
Harding argued that the Florida Supreme Court, " in its prior [protest] opinion, and all of the
parties agree that election controversies and contests must be finally and conclusively
determined by December 12, 2000." Id. at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting).
" Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 143-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that none of the
dates of December 12, 18, or 27 has ultimate significance in light of Congress' detailed
provisions for determining the validity of electoral votes on January 6); id. at 127 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (suggesting a date as late as January 4 based on Hawaii's electoral dispute of
1960); id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting the deadline for recount was the meeting
of electors on December 18); Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 528-29 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J.,
concurring) (questioning "whether any date prior to January 6 is a drop-dead date under the
Florida election scheme"); id.at 530 n. 14 (Pariente, J., concurring) (questioning whether the
December 12 deadline was "realistic or reasonable").
9' See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 133 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its
Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 269

(2001).
9' Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 135-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Farnsworth, supra note
3, at 230.
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law.96 Thus, what is "appropriate" relief under Florida law for a Florida statutory
violation is not a question the U.S. Supreme Court has power to decide. The only
exception to this prohibition is that the Court may interpret state law where a
federal issue is implicated.97 Take for example the case of an unconstitutional tax
in McKesson Corp. v. Division ofAlcoholic Beverages.9 8 In McKesson, the Florida
state court determined that a state beverage tax violated the federal Commerce
Clause and ordered a prospective remedy prohibiting the continued application of
the tax.99 The Supreme Court intervened to review the state remedy because the
federal interest of vindicating the Commerce Clause and due process was
involved.10 0 The Court held that the state remedy for a federal law violation failed
to provide the plaintiffs with meaningful relief by denying them retrospective relief,
that is, damages for past harm.'0 °
Meaningful relief for unconstitutional
deprivations, the McKesson Court held, is required by due process. 0 2 Thus, the
Court may intervene in cases where the state remedy for a federal right is
inadequate.
Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence in Bush v. Gore tried to fit the decision
into this exception justifying federal court intervention into state law.' 03 He argued
that Florida's failure to recognize the safe harbor date violated Article II of the
Constitution.0 4 Basing the decision upon the Article II grounds would have made
the issue of the safe harbor date a federal issue and explained the Court's meddling
into state law.'0 5 However, only three Justices agreed with this argument. The issue
of whether Florida law requires compliance with the safe harbor date does not
implicate a federal law. Thus, the absence of a federal interest with respect to the
safe harbor date should have precluded the Court from rendering its own decision
on state law. 06 The bottom line, as Justice Ginsburg acknowledged in her dissent
96
97

See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 608 (1874).
See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 473 (1945).

" 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
99 Id. at 25.
"'o Id. at 22.
101

Id.

102 Id.
103

4

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113-14 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

Id. at 113.

105 POSNER, supranote 94, at 151-52 (stating that the vulnerability ofthe Supreme Court's
remedy arises from its reliance on equal protection rather than Article II); Charles Fried, An
UnreasonableReaction to a Reasonable Decision, in BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY, supranote 89, at 16 & n. 11 (preferring the Article II argument made in Bush's
brief over the vulnerable remedial basis of the Court's actual decision); Posner, supra note
3, at 48 (basing the legitimacy of the Bush v. Gore decision upon the Article II concurrence).
Contra Lund, supra note 3, at 1265-67 (pointing out four analytical difficulties of Justice
Rehnquist's Article II analysis).
106 Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 231.
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in Bush v. Gore, is that the decision creates a new basis for the Court to opine on
issues of state law in contravention of 175 years of settled law."°7
As demonstrated by the Bush v. Gore decision, a federal court's ability to
substitute its own interpretation of state law on an issue of remedies allows it to
nullify state rights. Nullification of a right is accomplished by the denial of a
remedy. A remedy is a necessary component to every right required to make the
right tangible and meaningful.'08 If no remedy is imposed for the violation of state
law, then the state right is not vindicated, and it is relegated to mere normative
value. For example, the law against trespass consists of the descriptive norm
prohibiting interference with another's property and the remedy of damages
requiring a trespasser to pay for the harm she has caused by the interference.
Without a remedy of damages to redress the harm or injunctive relief to prevent the
harm, the law of trespass is nothing more than a moral expectation that cannot be
enforced in real life.0 9 This is precisely the result of Bush v. Gore where the
Supreme Court crafted an impractical prophylactic remedy and imposed an
impossible deadline that operated to deny meaningful relief for the state election
right, thereby nullifying that right." 0
Part of the blame for nullification may belong to the Florida Supreme Court for
its failure to craft some alternative relief that would have addressed the wrong. The
Supreme Court mandated only that a statewide recount be conducted with certain
standards and procedures and that it be done by December 12. But several other
remedial options were possible. The Florida court could have ordered preventive
relief to prevent harm in future elections by requiring counties to use the same
voting equipment, prohibiting punch card machines". or prohibiting butterfly
ballots." 2 It could have ordered reparative relief designed to cure the continuing
effects of the past election harm by excluding the total votes from suspect counties
or by prohibiting the Secretary from sending the electoral votes to Congress.' " Or
it could have ordered structural relief to change the state election system by
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
t08 Thomas, supra note 68, at 689.
109 E.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997) (awarding
nominal damages of $1 and punitive damages of $ 100,000 for intentional trespass because
"a right is hollow if the legal system provides insufficient means to protect it").
"o See Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore, in BUSH v.
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 89, at 118 (concluding that when the
Supreme Court stopped the recount it deprived state citizens of rights under state law by
federal judicial fiat).
...See Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
107

"2 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 140 (2001).

"' Id. at 126; see also In re Protest of Election Results, 707 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Ct. App.
1998) (voiding all absentee ballots in election rather than holding new election).
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requiring the election board to redesign vote tabulation procedures or requiring the
commission to establish uniform standards for recounts." 4 However, the Florida
Supreme Court merely opted out of the case after the Bush v. Gore decision, stating
"we hold appellants can be afforded no relief.""''
The Supreme Court's unprecedented use of the prophylactic remedy in Bush v.
Gore triggers some of the old concerns about prophylactic remedies existing since
the advent of Mirandaand its prophylactic warnings." 6 Prophylactics have been
attacked as judicial rulemaking that constitute an illegitimate exercise of judicial
power." 7 Prophylactics have also been falsely defamed as overbroad, excessive
reactions to legal problems, again outside the confines of appropriate judicial
action."' The following discussion addresses each of these criticisms in turn. The
Article concludes in Part II that the Bush Court's use of this type of prophylactic
remedy was not in itself problematic. Rather, it was the untailored and
inappropriate use of the prophylactic remedy that produced the suspect result as
discussed in Part I.
]I.UNDERSTANDING PROPHYLACTICS AS REMEDIES

In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court ordered Florida to adopt four necessary
safeguards in order to prevent future constitutional violations in recounts." 9 Similar
phraseology mandating necessary protective safeguards was used by the Court in
Miranda to characterize the newly-created warnings imposed to protect against
future constitutional violations. 20 In the aftermath of both cases, critics attacked
the safeguards as rules of conduct illegitimately created by the Court.'2 ' Incorrect
definitions of prophylactic have miscast the remedy as a mere rule of lesser status
than the "real" right.'22 These rules are claimed to be illegitimate exercises of the
""
"
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"'

ISSACHAROFF Er AL., supra note 112, at 140.
Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

See infra text accompanying notes 121 & 122, and notes 130-39 and accompanying

text.
"
"1
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See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.

Bush v.Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 457, 477, 511-12 (1966).

121 Paula

Alexander Becker & Richard J. Hunter, Jr., A Review of the Supreme Court's

2000 Term: Is There a Consistent Theme? 38 Hous. L. REV. 1463, 1465 (2002) ("The

decision of the United States Supreme Court [in Bush v. Gore] seemed to many to be the
height ofjudicial activism."); id.at 1465 n. 14 ("Activism is the charge thatjudges go beyond
their appropriate limited powers and engage in making laws or in forging public
policy . . . .") (emphasis deleted); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal
Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 101 (1985)

(criticizing the prophylactic rules of Miranda).
'22 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,444,454 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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Court's judicial power because they do not derive from the right itself, but instead
23
constitute new rights that the judiciary is not empowered to create. 1
The allegations of illegitimacy, however, stem from a misunderstanding of the
term "prophylactic" and its legal effect. Prophylactics are not rules; they are
remedies. A remedy is an intrinsic component of every legal "right."' 24 As
remedies, they are legitimate exercises of the courts' accepted power to impose an
adequate remedy to enforce the legal right. The remedy functions to enforce the
legal value and defines the scope of that value. The normal precedential effect of
a remedy is to create a decisional rule of law that directs judicial discretion in future
cases. This precedential effect distracted courts and academics and derailed the
discussion about prophylactics. Clarifying prophylactics as remedies with
precedential effects legitimizes prophylaxis as part of the courts' normal remedial
powers.
A. DismissingProphylacticRules as Illegitimate
The term "prophylactic" has become a judicial epithet used to identify
illegitimate judicial action.125 Indeed, Professor Evan Caminker has called for the
abandonment of the term "prophylactic" because it inappropriately raises concerns
of legitimacy where none should exist.126 However, it is not the term, but rather its
haphazard use and murky conceptualization by the courts and commentators that
have created the illusion of illegitimate court action.

(arguing that the prophylactic of Mirandais illegitimate because the constitutional right does
not require that rule); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,43 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("The first-tell-then-ask rule seems to be a prophylactic measure not so much extracted from
the text of any constitutional provision as crafted by the Ohio Supreme Court to reduce the
number of violations of textually guaranteed rights."); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53
(1973) ("It is an inherent attribute of prophylactic constitutional rules, such as those
established in Miranda and Pearce,that their... application will occasion windfall benefits
for some defendants who have suffered no constitutional deprivation.").
123 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454, 456, 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cassell, supra note 66,
at 898; Grano, supra note 121, at 101.
124 Thomas, supra note 68, at 694-95.
,25Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 368 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Apparently
as a means of identifying rules that it disfavors, the Court repeatedly uses the term
'prophylactic rule."'); Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic"
Rules, 70 U. CiN. L. REv. 1, 25 (2001); Landsberg, supra note 46, at 947 ("The Court has
used the term 'prophylactic' as an epithet and as a term of virtue.") (citation omitted); see,
e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus
Curie Urging Affirmance of the Judgment Below, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000) (No. 99-5525) [hereinafter Cassell Brief] (submitted by Professor Paul G. Cassell,
Court-Appointed Amicus).
126 Caminker, supra note 125, at 25.
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The hallmark of a prophylactic rule as currently understood in the scholarship
is its ability to be enforced in the absence of a violation of the related substantive

right. 27
' In one ofthe earliest definitions, Professor Grano described a prophylactic
rule as a "preventive safeguard" that creates the possibility that violating the
prophylactic rule will not actually violate the Constitution.12 He argued that

nothing is added by referring to a rule as prophylactic unless this actionable
characteristic is included.' 29 Thus, prophylactic has come to be used to characterize
judicial rules that seemingly create independently actionable rights.
The main criticism of prophylactic rules that has dominated the scholarship
since their origin has been that the rules are unauthorized exercises of the federal
courts' Article III power, and as such, they threaten to invade the powers of other

federal and state branches of government."3 ' The first argument is that Article III,
which grants courts judicial power to decide cases and interpret law, does not
authorize the judicial creation of new rights via prophylactic rules. 3 ' Secondly,
prophylactic rules have been criticized as violative of separation of powers

principles because thejudicial rules intrude upon Congress's prerogative to legislate
and create new rights.'32 And finally, the allegation is that prophylactic rules that
127 Susan

R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)FormulatingProphylacticRules, Safe Harbors,

and IncidentalRights in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1032

(2001) (defining "prophylactic rule" as a legal requirement that "may be 'triggered' by less
than a showing that the explicit [or true federal constitutional] rule was violated");
Landsberg, supra note 46, at 926 (distinguishing prophylactic rules from remedies and
defining them as "those risk-avoidance rules that are not directly sanctioned or required by
the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure that the government follows constitutionally
sanctioned or required rules").
12s Grano, supra note 121, at 101-02, 105-06. "What distinguishes a prophylactic rule
from a true constitutional rule is the possibility of violating the former without actually
violating the Constitution. A decision that promulgates or employs a prophylactic rule will
not attempt to demonstrate an actual violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in the
case under review." Id. at 105 (footnotes omitted).
129 Id. at 105 n.23.
1"0 JOSEPH GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW

173-98 (1993); Grano, supra

note 121, at 124-56; Landsberg, supranote 46, at 925; Thomas Schrock & Robert C. Welsh,
Reconsideringthe ConstitutionalCommon Law, 91 HARv.L.REv. 1117,1118 (1978) (failing
to treat prophylactic rules as a necessary dimension of a constitutional right raises acute

questions of legitimacy and constitutional authority).
"I' Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 460 (Scalia, J., dissenting); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711,741 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing prophylactic
rule of Pearceas "pure legislation if there ever was legislation"); Grano, supra note 121, at
123-24; Schtock & Welsh, supra note 130, at 1127 (stating that Marbury type judicial
review does not authorize subconstitutional prophylactic rules). But see Corr. Servs. Corp.
v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (recognizing the Court's "authority to imply a new
constitutional tort... anchored in [its] general jurisdiction to decide all cases 'arising under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."') (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 133 1).
132 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that adopting prophylactic
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control conduct at the state level intrude upon the states' power to act for the
general welfare in violation of federalism principles.'
This debate over the legitimacy of prophylactics formed the heart of the dispute
in Dickerson v. United States in which the Court reaffirmed the constitutionally
binding nature of Miranda warnings. 3' 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
avoided the challenge presented to address the general question of the legitimacy
of prophylactic rules. ' He avoided labeling the Miranda warnings "prophylactic"
despite past precedent to the contrary and instead referred to the warnings as a
"constitutional rule" and as guidelines with "constitutional underpinnings."'3
Justice Scalia, one of two dissenting Justices, was incensed by Rehnquist's
evasiveness,' 37 for he believed that the Court's reticence to engage the prophylactic
rules as a constitutional rule that cannot be altered by Congress "flagrantly offends
fundamental principles of separation of powers, and arrogates to [the Court] prerogatives
reserved to the representatives of the people"); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 130, at
1127-29 (identifying problems with prophylactic rulemaking that invades congressional
power to legislate and executive powers to define law enforcement methods); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., JudicialLegitimacy and the Unwritten Constitution:A Comment on

Miranda and Dickerson, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 119, 126-27 (2000) (describing Justice
Scalia's position that prophylactic rulemaking violates separation of powers).
"' Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael D. Hatcher, Printz Policy:
Federalism Undermines Miranda, 88 GEO. L.J. 177 (1999); Schrock & Welsh, supra note
130, at 1129-30 (asserting that prophylactic rules violate limits upon federal judicial power
to displace state law); see also Brief for the States of South Carolina et al. as Amici Curiae
Urging Affirmance at 17, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525):
Because this Court has held that the warnings are merely prophylactic, the
requirements should be regarded as, at most, interim procedures which protect
constitutional rights only until other procedures can be adopted by state bodies
with the power to set such rules for the courts of the States. Any suggestion that
the States cannot alter prophylactic rules, or that such rules may only be altered
by federal authorities, creates a risk to our federal system of government, under
which the "primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law" rests
with the States.
13'Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
131 Id. at 437-40.
136 Id. (acknowledging the Court's prior opinions that refer to the Miranda warnings as
prophylactic, but disagreeing that such protections are not constitutionally required). The
Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic" rules. Eg,
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994) (per curiam) (quoting Smith v.
Williams, 469 U.S. 91,95); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,690-91 (1993); Connecticut
v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306 (1985); New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984). However, the original Miranda decision never used
that term and instead referred to the warnings as "procedural safeguards." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
13' Fallon, supra note 132, at 126, 139-40 (describing Rehnquist's frustrating failure in
Dickerson to face up to the challenge posed by the dissent and calling the majority opinion
"painfully cryptic," "[d]eliberately opaque," "shallow," "question-begging," "elusive" and
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debate proved that it had overreached. 38 He therefore concluded that prophylactic
rules created by the Court constituted a "lawless practice" in that the Court
endorsed a "power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing
what it regards as useful 'prophylactic' restrictions upon Congress and the States.
That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist."'3
Commentators have superficially attempted to legitimize prophylactic rules by
comparing them to other interpretive or implementing rules. 14'
Professor Monaghan
was the first to defend prophylactics in the context of constitutional law by arguing
they were a type of subconstitutional implementing rule drawing their inspiration
from, but not required by, the constitutional right.' 4 ' Monaghan, and later Professor
Fallon, argued that the ubiquity of such implementing rules demonstrated their
legitimacy. 4 1 Other commentators have categorized prophylactics as regular
interpretive rules well within the judicial power. 43 The Court's references to
lacking "full candor"); Richard H.W. Maloy, Can a Rule be Prophylactic and Yet
Constitutional?,27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2465, 2498 (2001) (criticizing the Court in

Dickerson for failing to explain the basis of its decision upholding Miranda as a
constitutional rule).
138

Fallon, supra note 132, at 120.

9 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446, 457 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140 Caminker, supra note 125; Michael C. Dorf& Barry Friedman, SharedConstitutional
Interpretation,2000 S. CT. REV. 61, 73 n.47 ("Most of the academic literature accepts the
legitimacy of prophylaxis, with the debate focusing on how to justify it."); Melissa L.
Saunders, ReconsideringShaw: The Miranda ofRace-ConsciousDistricting,109 YALE L.J.
1603, 1605 (2000) (discussing overprotective prophylactic rules including examples from
First Amendment, equal protection and redistricting law); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of
ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 203-05 (1988) [hereinafter Strauss, Ubiquity];
David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 963
(2001).
41

HenryMonaghan, Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV.L. REV. 1 (1975)

(describing prophylactic rules as part of the "constitutional common law" consisting of a
substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions, which could be
superseded by Congress); see also Fallon, supra note 132, at 128-31 (characterizing
prophylactic rules as part of the judicial rules used to implement the Constitution such as
standards of review and rules of stare decisis); Susan R. Klein, Miranda
Deconstitutionalized:When the Self-IncriminationClauseand the Civil Rights Act Collide,

143 U. PA. L. REV.417, 482-87 (1994) (agreeing with Monaghan's theory of constitutional
common law but finding that such law is temporarily required by the Constitution in some
instances).
142 Fallon, supra note 132, at 131, 137 ("Prophylactic rules stand among a cluster ofwellestablished doctrines and practices justified by the requirements of reasonably successful
constitutional implementation."); Monaghan, supranote 141 (arguing that the commonality
of prophylactic rules explains common creation of constitutional common law that federal
courts may impose upon states via the Supremacy Clause).
"4'Caminker, supra note 125; Klein, supra note 127, at 1031-33 (defining a

2002]

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF BUSH V. GoRE

prophylactic measures as "bright-line," '44 "conclusive,"' 4 or generally
"protective"' 46 rules seem to support this view of prophylactics as regular doctrinal
rules. Thus, Professors Caminker and Strauss have argued that prophylactic rules,
and in particular Miranda warnings, are simply rules used to detect constitutional
violations akin to protective, strict scrutiny rules or bright-line content-based First
Amendment rules.' 47 Such interpretive doctrines, they argue, are straightforward
exercises of legitimate judicial power to interpret rights. 148
These theories, however, fail to explain the legitimacy ofprophylactics. 49 They
all touch on the surface of the issue and use terms that explain some effects of
prophylactics. 5' 0 However, these facile descriptions do not suffice to answer critics
"'constitutional prophylactic rule' as a"judicially-created doctrinal rule or legal requirement
determined by the Court as appropriate for deciding whether an explicit or 'true' federal
constitutional rule is applicable"); Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement
Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149, 1174-75 (1998) (asserting that prophylactic rules
are legitimate exercises of the Court's power to formulate doctrinal rules interpreting the
Constitution); Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 140.
'4 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000) ("A bright-line prophylactic rule may be
the best way to provide protection, and, at the same time, by offering clear guidance and
avoiding subjectivity, to protect speech itself."); United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454,474 (1995) ("The Government's only argument against a general nexus
limitation is that a wholesale prophylactic rule is easier to enforce than one that requires
individual nexus determinations."); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348 (1990)
(characterizing the prophylactic rule of Michigan v. Jackson as a "bright-line rule" for
deciding whether an accused who has asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
subsequently waived that right).
14"Harvey, 494 U.S. at 349 (describing prophylactic rule of Miranda as establishing a
"presumption" of invalidity for "some waivers that would be considered voluntary... under
the traditional case-by-case inquiry"); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984)
(interpreting prophylactic rule ofNorth Carolinav. Pearceas requiring trial judges to clearly
justify any sentence increased on remand with new objective information to rebut a
"presumption" ofjudicial vindictiveness).
14 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1.999) (stating that the primary
objective of Title VII and its prohibition of sexual harassment is a "prophylactic one" that
aims not at redressing but rather at avoiding harm); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
73 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (endorsing Chicago's "prophylactic measure" ofprohibiting
loitering in the presence of a known gang member in the absence of a legitimate purpose in
order to prevent crime); Withrow v. Wilson, 507 U.S. 680,,691 (1993) ('Prophylactic'
though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, Miranda safeguards a 'fundamental trial right"') (citations omitted); Harvey,
494 U.S. at 368-69 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (stating that "all rules of law are prophylactic"
because they are designed to prevent harm).
147 Caminker, supra note 125, at 2, 7; Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 140, at 204-05.
141Caminker, supra note 125, at 22; Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 140, at 208.
149Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor

Schulhofer, 55 U. Cml-.
L. REV. 174, 178 (1988).

"0oSee infra notes 166-83 and accompanying text.
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of prophylactics like Justice Scalia. The theory of implementing rules is flawed to
the extent it is based upon the judicial supervisory power to make internal
procedural rules for the federal courts. 5 ' As academics have previously
established, the supervisory power cannot explain how prophylactics have applied
in state courts or trumped congressional action.'52 Thus, this theory was expressly
rejected as a foundation for prophylactics by the Supreme Court in Dickerson.'
The interpretation rule theory is also flawed because it does not describe how
additional measures, such as police warnings or recount standards, "interpret" the
Constitution. Prophylactic measures operate as external directives rather than
internal standards for courts, and thus, as Professor Grano, the most prominent critic
of prophylactics has argued, prophylactics are different from run-of-the-mill
doctrinal rules. 54
' It is the legitimacy of these externally binding types of rules and
not the legitimacy of other types of substantive or procedural doctrinal rules that is
in question.'
The analytical detour for these supporters of prophylactics has been the
conceptualization of prophylactics as rules. The uniform thread running through
this mishmash of legal commentary is that prophylactics are rules, secondary in
importance to "real" legal rights.' 6 The real "rights," it is argued, exist in the text

'' See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 130, at 1142 (stating that Monaghan's theory of
constitutional common law "seems indistinguishable from the supervisory power");
Monaghan, supra note 141, at 18 (discussing the rulemaking authority of federal courts).
'52 Sara Sun Beale, ReconsideringSupervisoryPowerin CriminalCases: Constitutional
and StatutoryLimits on the Authority of the FederalCourts, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 1433, 1434
(1984) ("Supervisory power rulings... by definition... apply only in federal proceedings");
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 130, at 1141 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court has no
"general supervisory power over the state courts"); see also Maloy, supra note 137, at
2470-71 (describing Dickerson as having rejected supervisory power as basis for
prophylactic rules).
'13 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
"' Grano, supra note 149; Grano, supra note 121, at 103, 115-23 (discussing cases
improperly categorized as prophylactic rules that do not raise legitimacy questions because
they exemplify the traditional judicial review that Marbury v. Madison authorized); see also
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 457 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining several cases of alleged
legitimate prophylactic rules identified by the petitioner as nothing more than regular cases
"in which the Court quite simply exercised its traditional judicial power to define the scope
of constitutional protections and, relatedly, the circumstances in which they are violated").
'"

Grano, supra note 149, at 177.

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 451-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dickerson v. United States, 166
F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]hether Congress has the authority to enact § 3501 turns
on whether the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Miranda is required by the
Constitution. Clearly it is not. At no point did the Supreme Court in Miranda refer to the
warnings as constitutional rights."), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Grano, supra note 21, at
115-23; Monaghan, supra note 141.
156
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of the constitutional or statutory codification.'57 Rules are conceptualized as
judicial directives created to guide the court internally in its resolution of the
case.' 58 They address "technical details and policies intrinsic to the litigation
process, not the regulation of primary behavior and policies extrinsic to the
litigation process."' 5 9 For example, rules like the three-part test for an equal
protection violation are used by the court internally to interpret the extent of
constitutional protections and to detect violations. 60 Interpretive rules are also used
to direct the courts in the issuance of remedies, as in the case of the irreparable
injury rule that directs a court to award injunctive relief only if legal remedies are
inadequate."'6 In yet another example, implementing rules, such as standards of
review or rules of evidence, direct the court in the process of reaching its
decision.'6 2 All of these substantive and procedural rules are simply internal
guidelines for the courts; they are not actual rights. Thus, prophylactic decisions
that appear to apply such rules externally as mandatory legal requirements are
pejoratively labeled "judicial legislation" by which the court illegitimately directs
63
the conduct of others. 1
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 451-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
...Beale, supra note 152, at 1465; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73,
83 (authorizing the federal courts to establish "all necessary rules for the orderly conducting
[of] business"); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over Rules of Precedent,50 DUKE
L.J. 503, 512 (2000) (explaining that rules of stare decisis and precedent are internal rules
ofjudicial reasoning). Rules are often distinguished from standards as the more mechanical,
inflexible directives guiding the judicial decision maker in her resolution of the dispute.
Overton, supranote 4, at 66; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The JusticesofRules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992).
' Beale, supra note 152, at 1465.
60 Caminker, supra note 125, at 26 (using the Court's rules for the Equal Protection
Clause as an example of the judicial use of doctrinal rules to screen out unconstitutional
conduct); Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 140, at 204-05 (citing the Equal Protection Clause
as a "relatively obvious example" of the development ofjudicial rules to find constitutional
violations); R. Randall Kelso, Standardsof Review Underthe EqualProtectionClause and
Related ConstitutionalDoctrinesProtectingIndividualRights: The "BasePlus Six" Model
and Modern Supreme Court Practice,4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 232 ("[T]he Court is
naturally drawn to phrasing the doctrine as a three-part test, focusing on governmental ends,
the statute's relationship to achieving benefits, and the statute's burden on individuals.").
161 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 228-30 (2d ed.
1993); see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 687 (1990) (arguing that the ancient rule no longer operates to preclude injunctive
relief).
162 Harrison, supra note 158, at 512-13 (comparing rules of precedent and stare
decisis
to rules of evidence as both are internal rules of judicial reasoning). But cf. Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 52 (1973) (finding the prophylactic rules in Pearceand Mirandato be
similar in that each was designed to preserve the integrity of a phase of the criminal process).
163 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 130, at 1132, 1155 (referring to prophylactic rules as
judicial legislation); Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 140, at 190 (describing the Miranda
'"
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The existing rule-based scholarship therefore has failed to answer the
allegations of judicial illegitimacy because it has taken a micro rather than macro
approach to the issue. This micro approach focuses on isolated effects appearing
to emanate from the prophylaxis such as the creation of a new actionable right, the
establishment of a conclusive presumption, and the creation of a detection
standard.' 64 What is needed, however, is a macro analysis that places all of the
effects into context and answers the claims of illegitimacy. The theory that easily
connects these analytical dots is one that conceptualizes prophylactics as remedies.
This distinction between remedies and rules is not one of mere semantics, 6 1 for the
recharacterization finally provides an answer validating prophylactics.
B. Prophylacticsas Remedies

The key point is that prophylactics are remedies, and remedies are legitimate
judicial actions that have continuing precedential effects in future cases. Scholars
have danced around this point, recognizing parallels between prophylactic rules and
remedies but failing to take the critical step of acknowledging that prophylaxis is
in fact a remedy.' 66 Indeed, few remedies scholars have comprehended the import
of this remedy 167 despite the judicial use of it for the past thirty-five years.'68 The
decision as one that "reads more like a legislative committee report with an accompanying
statute") (footnote omitted).
164

Cassell Brief, supra note 125; Grano, supra note 121, at 105; Klein, supra note 127,

at 1031-32, 1037-38.
David Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the
Fifth Amendment, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 274 (2000) (stating that the discrepancy
in the Court's language sometimes calling prophylactics remedies and sometimes calling
16'

them rules is a matter of semantics because "the effects are the same no matter how the Court
couches its reasoning"); Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 140, at 196.
166 See Beale, supra note 152, at 1495 ("This section considers only remedies, not
related
issues of prophylactic rulings that do not rest on a finding that federal law has been
violated."); Klein, supra note 127, at 1033 (describing as an "incidental right" the remedial
effect of failure to comply with prophylactic rule, but distinguishing that incidental right from
a true prophylactic rule); Klein, supra note 141, at 481 (arguing that "some remedy or
procedure is necessary to safeguard a constitutional provision"); Landsberg, supra note 46,
at 964 (arguing that a requisite standard for the imposition of a prophylactic rule is that it be
designed to protect a clear constitutional right).
167 For example, the leading'remedies treatises and most remedies textbooks contain no
discussion ofprophylactic remedies. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 161; Fiss &RENDLEMAN,
INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984); LEAVELL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITABLE

REMEDIES, RESTITUTION, AND DAMAGES (6th ed. 1994); RUSSELL WEAVER ET AL, MODERN

(2000). Only Professors Laycock, Schoenbrod, and Shoben have embraced such
a concept and briefly explained it in their respective case books. LAYCOCK, supranote 45,
REMEDIES

at 272;
16'

SCHOENBROD,

supra note 46, at 131-34 ; SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 45, at 246.

Landsberg, supra note 46, at 926 (stating that review of the case law reveals a long
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muddled scholarship has created a false debate over the legitimacy of prophylactic
"rules" by its failure to recognize the remedial nature of the prophylactics and its
failure to understand remedies are not secondary rules inferior to and separate from
the real right.'6 9
Recent scholarship, including my own, has challenged the long-held theory of
remedies as a secondary right and instead has argued that a remedy is an intrinsic
part of every substantive right. 7 What I have called "the unified right theory"
posits that rights are comprised of two key components: the inert skeletal matter of
Both
the substantive guarantee and the operative lifeblood of the remedy.'
guarantee and remedy are needed to create a legal right. Thus, remedies are not
secondary rules of procedure or other inferior mechanisms that are detached from
the real right.' 72 A remedy does function as an instrument to effectuate or enforce
a guarantee.'73 However, it does much more through its power to define the scope
As Professor Levinson carefully detailed in his work
and shape of the right.'
entitled Rights EssentialismandRemedial Equilibration,a remedy defines a legal
right by providing specific examples that interpret the meaning and scope of an
otherwise amorphous, abstract value such as "equal protection."' 75 For example,
history of judicial creation of prophylactic rules but a lack of self-conscious judicial
examination of the rules); Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 140, at 196 ("[W]hether a doctrine
should be viewed as prophylactic depends not on how the Court happens to have written its
opinions but on how the relevant constitutional provision is most plausibly interpreted.").
169

See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 CoLUM.

L. REV. 857, 861 (1999) (describing the common legal misunderstanding, including
Monaghan's theory of constitutional common law, of thinking of remedies as segregated
rules distinct from the superior pure right).
170 Thomas, supra note 68, at 679-95; see also Huitema, supra note 165, at 269 n.51 ("It
can be extremely difficult to disentangle the definition of a right and the remedies available
for a violation - they are flip sides of a single coin."); Levinson, supra note 169, at 857
("[R]ights and remedies in constitutional law are interdependent and inextricably
intertwined."); Donald Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated
Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 69 (2001) ("Rights, rights of action, and remedies are
inextricably related; one cannot make a decision about one of them without necessarily
affecting the other.").
'7
Thomas, supra note 68, at 688.
17' Thomas, supra note 68, at 687; see also Levinson, supra note 169, at 857.
171

Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The FirstAmendment,And PublicEmployee Speech:

Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 939-40 (2001)
("Constitutional rights do not exist in a vacuum, hermetically sealed from the rest of the legal
universe. Their value depends in large measure on the remedial vehicles available for
redressing violations"); see also Landsberg, supra note 46, at 927 (explaining that the
Supreme Court has used the term prophylactic synonymously with the term "instrumental").
17'Thus I disagree with Professor Klein that prophylactic rules and their related effect of
creating incidental rights are "purely instrumental" and "have no utility outside of that
function." Klein, supra note 127, at 1033-34.
175 Levinson, supra note 169, at 885-87; see also Beale, supra note 152, at 1475
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the Court imposed a variety of remedies in the desegregation cases, including some
which reached the economic or social causes and consequences of desegregation.' 76
These consequential remedies thus redefined the right against racial discrimination
to include de facto rather than simply de jure segregation. 77
' Since the guarantee
and remedy are unified into one right, a judicial decision about the remedy
necessarily is a decision about the right. A decision about a prophylactic remedy
like Mirandaor Bush, therefore, is also a decision about the attendant constitutional
right.
Rehnquist's opinion in Dickerson upholding the Mirandaprophylactic remedy
as a "constitutional rule" implicitly adopts this unified right theory.'78 While he
does not identify the warnings as prophylactic remedies, Rehnquist reaches the
same result by concluding that the Miranda "rules" are in fact part of the Court's
interpretation of the constitutional right.' 79 The unified right theory explains this
result. The guidelines comprise a prophylactic remedy that is needed to adequately
enforce the constitutional right against self-incrimination because, as the Miranda
Court initially found, violations can easily go undetected by an injunction simply
prohibiting coerced confessions due to the secretive nature of interrogations. 8 '
Thus, the Miranda remedy performs an instrumental function in enforcing the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. However, the Mirandaremedy also
defines the guarantee against "self-incrimination" by redefining the constitutional
value to prohibit uninformed self-incrimination.'' Thus, a decision about the
attendant remedy for a constitutional guarantee is a "constitutional decision" that
is "constitutionally based" as the Court held in Dickerson.'82
Conceptually, Rehnquist got it right in Dickerson; he just demonstrated the
(describing rules regarding the nature and extent of remedies as substantive because they
define the right).
176

See supra note 63.

Levinson, supra note 169, at 876 ("[E]very jurisdiction that had ever engaged in de
jure segregation .. .had an affirmative obligation to achieve racial integration, which
required remedying not just de jure but also de facto segregation.").
78 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
179 Id. at 444 ("Mirandaannounced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede
legislatively.").
180 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966) (recognizing the "dangers of
interrogation and the appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very fact of
interrogation itself').
1

181

See Levinson, supra note 169, at 901,908-09.

Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the remedy ofthe exclusionary rule is "constitutionally required, not
as a 'right' explicitly incorporated in the fourth amendment's prohibitions, but as a remedy
necessary to ensure that those prohibitions are observed in fact.") (quoting Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
1

ExclusionaryRule in Search-and-SeizureCases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1389 (1983)).
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same definitional aversion as many scholars, attributing a negative connotation to
the label "prophylactic."' 8 3 Understanding prophylactics as remedies, however,
answers the legitimacy critics like those in Dickerson that such measures are outside
a court's power. A remedial characterization justifies the external proscription of
prophylactic measures, because individualized injunctive remedies force parties to
comply with court directives. The remedial power is generally well-accepted as a
legitimate exercise ofjudicial power. Moreover, viewing prophylactics as remedies
explains the consequential rule-like effects that have confounded commentators.
1. A Distinct Type of Individualized Remedy
A prophylactic remedy properly understood is a specific subset of injunctive
relief. It is distinguished from other remedies by its hallmark imposition of
additional proscriptions of otherwise legal conduct. As an injunction, a
prophylactic remedy operates as a personal command against the defendant
requiring certain conduct. '" This judicial command is enforced by the power of
contempt for which a defendant can be fined or imprisoned for failing to obey the
court's order.'85 In this way, the prophylactic measures convert the innocuous
conduct into required law. 8 6 Prophylactic measures thereby become mandatory
enforceable rights with respect to the particular individuals in the case.
A prophylactic measure is imposed by a court only as a reaction to a proven
violation of law. 87
' This reactive origination of prophylactics reveals their remedial
rather than rule-like nature. Indeed, in the absence of a violation, the Supreme

Rehnquist's avoidance of the prophylactic debate is all the more curious as he seems
to be the one Justice who clearly understands the concept of prophylactic. In Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), he first characterized Mirandaas a "prophylactic rule[]." Id.
at 439. It was he who used the term to describe the Court's actions in Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 (1978), ordering injunctive relief containing measures addressing conduct that did
not violate the Constitution. Id.at 712. He used the same definition of prophylactic to
circumscribe Congress' legislative powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). And it was he who in Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994), clearly endorsed the use of prophylactic
measures. Id. at 753.
84 See DOBBS, supra note 161, at 162 (discussing injunctive relief generally).
185 Id. at 130.
186 SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 45, at 246.
187 Landsberg, supranote 46, at 964 (suggesting the principle that a prophylactic rule may
only be imposed to protect a clear constitutional right); cf Thomas, supra note 68, at 714
(arguing that the legislative remedial power under Section 5 like the judicial remedial power
must be reactive to an established or likely violation). Contra Huitema, supra note 165, at
274 (arguing that the Court has the implied power to create not only indispensable remedies,
but also "contingent constitutional requirements").
183
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Court has refused to impose prophylactic rules. Thus, in Rizzo v. Goode,'88 the
Court refused to impose prophylactic measures of new manuals, procedures, and a
civilian complaint system for the police department where no violation was found
by the court."8 9 Similarly, in Lewis v. Casey, 9 ' the Court refused to impose
prophylactic standards dictating measures for a prison library where no
constitutional violation arose out of the library itself.'9' Prophylactics are not
examples of independent judicial rulemaking. Rather, they are remedial measures
employed by the court in reaction to proven harm in order to prevent further harm
in the future.
Prophylactic relief is a term of art that should not be used carelessly, as it has
been, to describe other types of remedies.'92 In particular, so-called "deterrent"
remedies such as the exclusionary rule and automatic dismissal rule of criminal
procedure should not be called "prophylactic"' 93 despite the Court's use of the term
to describe these criminal sanctions. ' The judicial confusion seems to have begun
188 423

U.S. 362 (1976).

Id. at 376-77 (distinguishing Swann and its imposition of prophylactic relief because
such broad equitable relief is available only once a violation of a constitutional right is
shown).
89

518 U.S. 343 (1996).
9' Id. at 362-63.

190

"9 For example, it should not be used to describe constitutional damages that may be
generally protective of rights, as used by Justice Harlan in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to describe the compensatory damages awarded. Id. at 408 n.8
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir.
1994) (equating a prophylactic rule and a Bivens remedy). Compensatory damages that
provide money for a plaintiff's loss share none of the remedial attributes and-purposes of a
prophylactic measure. Nor should the term prophylactic be used to describe structural
injunctions that are characterized by their alteration of public and private structures that
systematically have violated the law. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorney

Generals, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1988) (comparing prophylactic and structural remedies).
Examples of structural injunctions include dividing Microsoft's monopolistic business
structure into two companies or integrating Topeka Schools to restructure the segregated
education.
193 Grano, supra note 121, at 103-04 (criticizing Professor Monaghan for lumping
together prophylactic rules and deterrent remedies, such as the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, which are not identical); Klein, supranote 127, at 1048-49 (distinguishing
prophylactic rules and the exclusionary rule but failing to recognize the prophylactic
remedy); see also Meltzer, supra note 192, at 249 (defining deterrent remedies as those in
which the litigant obtains more than he is entitled to, measured against the harm to his rights
that he has suffered or is likely to suffer in the future).
'" Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 260-62 (1985) (labeling the automatic reversal
remedy for racial discrimination in jury selection as "prophylactic"); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (describing the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment as a
"prophylactic device"). To the extent that I may have suggested that the Vasquez rule was

2002]

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF BUSH V.GORE

with Miranda,which involved two remedies: a prophylactic injunction proscribing
future warnings and a reparative injunction excluding the confession. Yet Miranda
was simply an example of the common occurrence of multiple remedies being
awarded in a single case.
Deterrent remedies like the exclusionary rule are distinct in purpose and form
from prophylactic remedies.' 95 First, deterrent remedies are intended to penalize
wrongdoers and/or restore victims of past harm. 9 6 The purpose of a prophylactic
remedy, by contrast, is to enhance protection against future harm. Exclusionary
remedies are preventive only in the sense that all remedies can be said to prevent
or deter illegal action by establishing consequences that potential wrongdoers wish
to avoid. 9 7 Second, deterrent remedies defensively shield the plaintiff against prior
illegality, whereas prophylactic remedies offensively fight against future harm.'98
a prophylactic remedy, I too have been careless. See Thomas, supra note 68, at 725.
'9'

Tracy A. Thomas, Remedies Forum:JusticeScaliaReinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A.

L. REV. 101 1063 (2003) (suggesting that the availability of statutory remedies should be
determined by remedial purpose rather than pleading form).
196 See

Jerry E. Norton, The ExclusionaryRule Reconsidered.Restoring the Status Quo
Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 261 (1998) (arguing that the exclusionary rule is

justified "because it puts both the State and the accused in the positions they would have been
in had the Constitution not been violated"); William A. Schroeder, Restoringthe Status Quo
Ante: The FourthAmendment ExclusionaryRule as a CompensatoryDevice,51 GEO. WASH.

L. REv. 633, 655 (1983) ("[T]he preoccupation of fourth amendment analysis obscures the
compensatory function of exclusion."). It should be noted, however, that the remedial nature
of the exclusionary rule has not yet reached consensus as the academy is still debating such
rules along the same path as the debate over prophylactics. As in the case of prophylactics,
the Court and commentators have disagreed about the character and legitimacy of the
exclusionary rule. CompareNorton, supra(stating that the exclusionary rule is an individual
restorative remedy), with Meltzer, supra note 192 (endorsing the Court's statements that the
exclusionary rule is not an individual remedy but a deterrent remedy in which the litigant
serves as a private attorney general), and William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment
ExclusionaryRule as a ConstitutionalRemedy, 88 GEO. L. J. 799, 802 (2000) (arguing that

the exclusionary rule is a disgorgement remedy rather than a reparative or deterrent remedy).
At times the rule has been described as a right, United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914), a remedy, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976), a deterrent, United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974), and most recently as a "prudential rule," Pa. Bd. of
Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998). The exclusionary rule debate, like
that of the prophylactic rule, has focused on whether the Constitution requires the imposition
of the rule. See Scott, 524 U.S. at 362.
1' See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy ofFull Compensation,73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145,

151 (1995) ("Damages based on harm engender theoretically sufficient deterrence by
ensuring that no breach of contract or other risk-causing activity is undertaken where the
defendant's expected damages exceeds [sic] the expected gains.")
198 See Grano, supranote 121, at 104 (distinguishing prophylactic rules that are intended
to prevent future harms from deterrent remedies like the exclusionary rule that apply only
after an actual violation has occurred); Meltzer, supra note 192, at 251 (describing the

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:343

And finally, deterrent remedies are simple prohibitions excluding evidence or
dismissing cases. Prophylactic remedies, by contrast, are complex orders consisting
of multiple, detailed requirements. Thus, grouping deterrent remedies with
prophylactic remedies further obfuscates the law.
Fundamentally, the legitimacy of prophylactic remedies is based upon the
legitimacy of judicial remedies. Understanding the true nature of prophylactics as
remedies rather than rules eliminates the legitimacy concerns associated with
otherwise random judicial rulemaking.'99 Remedies are an inherent part of the
unified right and thus are legitimate exercises of the Marbury-typejudicial power."° '
2. Judicial Remedial Power
It is well-accepted that federal courts possess the implicit structural power to
provide a remedy for a wrong.20 ' This remedial authority is inherent in the "judicial
power" extended to the federal courts by Article III of the Constitution. 2
defensive exclusionary rule and offensive structural injunctions); see, e.g., Bullock v. Md.
Casualty Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804, 811 (Ct. App. 200 1) (distinguishing prophylactic costs,
not covered by insurance, applied to repair expenses as those prospective measures intended
to avert future harm rather than compensate for past conduct).
"' See Doff & Friedman, supra note 140, at 64 ("This understanding of Dickerson as
constitutionalinterpretation makes it possible to sidestep most of the academic debate about
whether the Court has the authority to promulgate 'prophylactic rules' or 'constitutional
common law."'); Grano, supra note 121, at 157 (justifying prophylactic rules as
constitutionally required avoids illegitimacy); Norton, supra note 196, at 283 ("Put most
directly, when the exclusionary rule is viewed as a legal remedy designed to protect a private
legal right, the recognition of that remedy is solidly within the power of the judiciary under
long-recognized principles of Anglo-American law.")
200

David E. Engdahl, IntrinsicLimits ofCongress 'PowerRegardingthe JudicialBranch,

1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 170 ("Surely 'remedy' is the most fundamental and essential element
ofjudicial power [as recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison].").
20 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (stating that the
Supreme Court has two functions: primarily, to interpret the Constitution, and secondly, to
implement the Constitution through the imposition of remedies and other judicial practices);
Beale, supra note 152, at 1495 (stating that the courts' power to fashion appropriate
nonstatutory remedies for violations of federal law is equally as well established as the
Article III power to interpret federal law); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term - Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, I I HARV. L. REV. 54
(1997).
202 Engdahl, supra note 200, at 170; see also Walter Dellinger, OfRights and Remedies:
The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1541 (1972) (locating the source of

the Supreme Court's remedial power in Article III); cf Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I assume for purposes of this case that the remedial
authority of the federal courts is inherent in the 'judicial power,' as there is no general
equitable remedial power expressly granted by the Constitution or by statute."); Lawrence
Crocker, Can the ExclusionaryRule Be Saved?, 84 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 310, 346-47
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Alexander Hamilton discussed the extent of the federal courts' role in The
FederalistPapers:
The first point depends upon this obvious consideration,
that there
ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to
constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on
the authority of the State legislatures, without some constitutional mode
of enforcing the observance of them? The States, by the plan of the
convention, are prohibited from doing a variety ofthings, some of which
are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the
principles of good government ....No man of sense will believe, that
such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded without some
effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions
of them.2 °3
In other words, Hamilton's discourse embodied the common law maxim of ubi
jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right, there must be a remedy." 4 For without
a remedy, federal rights become mere words that prescribe limits but declare "that
those limits may be passed at pleasure."2 5 Marbury v. Madison adopted this
historical notion that courts have the duty to impose a remedy in order to enforce

(1993):
Redressing the injuries of litigants is traditionally within the power of courts in
the common law tradition. It does not follow from that fact that it is within the
Article III judicial power. It is, however, not an extravagant proposition that
such authority was within the judicial power or that it was granted by Congress
along with the authority to decide federal question cases. To have the power to
decide cases is to have the power to provide at least some reasonable menu of
remedies to litigants.
20'
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 515-16 (Alexander Hamilton) (photo. reprint 2000)
(1788).
204 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109 ("[I]t is a settled and
invariable
principle in the laws of England, that every right when with-held must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress."); Norton, supra note 196, at 262 ("The principle that for
every right there is a remedy - ubijus, ibi remedium - was a rule at English Common Law
which the Supreme Court recognized as being central to American constitutional law
beginning with Marbury v. Madison."); Zeigler, supra note 170, at 71-82 (tracing the
"ancient and venerable" principle that rights must have remedies).
205 Meltzer, supra note 192, at 282 (noting that experience has shown the
critical need for
attention to realistic enforcement mechanisms for constitutional rights that can transform
rights proclaimed on paper into practical protections) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 173 (1803)); Klein, supra note 141, at 460-61 (recognizing natural human
tendency to assume that if there is no remedy, officers do not have to honor Miranda

warnings or the prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment).
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the laws which they interpret. 0 6 Moreover, the lawyer Hamilton's reference to the
remedial terms "restrain or correct" suggests that equitable injunctive remedies
were in fact the preferred remedial option identified by the framers to enforce
federal rights.2" 7

The Court's inherent power to remedy wrongs includes the power to select the
appropriate remedy from among the remedial options. °8 A common objection to
prophylactic remedies, like Miranda warnings, is that they are inappropriate
because they are not required by the Constitution. 20 9 But of course, the Constitution
does not require any particular remedy, except perhaps just compensation in the
event of a taking.2" ° The selection of the appropriate remedy is the Court's
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); Fallon, supra note 132, at
128 (arguing that the Supreme Court has two "entrenched functions": to interpret the
Constitution'and specify its meaning and to implement the Constitution through the crafting
of rules and remedies).
207 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). This preference for injunctive
rather
than compensatory remedies follows the Supreme Court's recent Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, which has upheld the continued viability of Exparte Young type injunctions
for federal law violations even when restricting the availability of damages. See, e.g., Alden
206

v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony Of Immunity: The Eleventh

Amendment, IrreparableInjury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1311 (2001).
208
. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (holding that federal courts have a duty
to "be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose" of the federal law); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[W]here federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will
be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."); Grano, supra note 121,
at 101 ("When the Court holds that certain conduct violates the Constitution or that the
Constitution requires a particular remedy, we may disagree strongly with the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution, but we may not challenge the legitimacy of its authority.
Marbury settled this legitimacy issue."); Klein, supra note 141, at 482 (arguing that "some
remedy or procedure isnecessary to safeguard a constitutional provision, but the Constitution
itself does not specific which remedies or procedures to utilize," and thus it is the Court's
obligation under the Constitution to create the body of law necessary to provide the
appropriate remedy).
209 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What
makes a decision constitutional.., is the determination that the Constitution requires the
result.").
"0 United States v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause requires general measure of compensatory damages to remedy
unconstitutional taking); Fallon, supra note 132, at 129 (noting that "[tihe Constitution
includes virtually no express provisions establishing remedies for constitutional violations,"
yet the Court has claimed authority to devise a broad range of remedies as are appropriate
to promote constitutionally grounded interests); Daryl J.Levinson, Making GovernmentPay:
Markets, Politics,and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 346

(2000) ("The eminent domain clause of the Constitution prohibits government from taking
private property for public use without just compensation - in effect mandating a "remedy"
of compensation for interference with certain constitutionally protected property rights.").
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prerogative. Indeed, the Court has an obligation to provide adequate relief that is
effective to give meaning to the legal guarantee. 21' Thus, in Bivens v. Six Unknown
NamedAgents,21 2the Court explained that it had the power to determine and impose
the appropriate remedy to provide adequate relief Even in cases of statutory rights,
the Court has reiterated its power and prerogative to select the appropriate remedy
when it is not statutorily prescribed." 3 Thus, the choice of a prophylactic remedy
instead of a simple preventive or reparative injunction is part of the Court's
legitimate exercise of remedial power.
There are, however, those critics who challenge the legitimacy of federally
imposed, broad injunctions mandating affirmative conduct.2" 4 The attacksprimarily
upon structural relief parallel those on the legitimacy of prophylactic rules, which
argue that broad injunctive relief exceeds the courts' Article IIi power in violation
of federalism and separation of powers principles because it impermissibly
legislates conduct.2" 5 Critics argue that federal courts have no (or only
extraordinarily limited) power to issue affirmative proscriptions of conduct because
such equitable remedies were not available at common law and because the Framers
rejected this notion ofunfettered equitable discretion." 6 Instead, they argue, federal

212

Thomas, supra note 68, at 758.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).

213

See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Statutory rights are

211

slightly different in that Congress may dictate the remedy where it has created the right. In

contrast, Congress may not dictate the remedy for a right, such as a constitutional right, that
it has not created. Thomas, supra note 68, at 701.
214 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 364 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 132 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as
PoliticalPowerbroker:SuperintendingStructuralChange in Public Institutions,65 VA. L.
REV. 43, 103-06 (1979); William A. Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution:Institutional
Remedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 648-49 (1982); Alfred M. Mamlet,
Reconsiderationof Separation of Powers and the BargainingGame: Limiting the Policy
DiscretionofJudges andPlaintiffsin InstitutionalSuits, 33 EMORY L.J. 685,685-86 (1985);
Paul J. Mishkin, FederalCourts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978);
Robert F. Nagel, Separationof Powers and the Scope of FederalEquitableRemedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot? The
Inherent Remedial Authority of FederalCourts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996).
25 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that permitting the federal
courts to exercise virtually unlimited equitable remedial powers has "trampled upon
principles of federalism and the separation of powers and has freed courts to pursue other

agendas unrelated to the narrow purpose of precisely remedying a constitutional harm.");
Sturm, supra note 72, at 1403 (summarizing the critics' charge that the court's role in
imposing broad public remedies like structural and prophylactic reliefexceeds the boundaries

of judicial authority in contravention of federalism and the limits of equity power); Yoo,
supra note 214, at 1123-24.
216 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 124-34 (Thomas, J., concurring); Yoo, supra note 214, at

1141-66.
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courts are limited to issuing negative injunctions that simply prohibit conduct,
affirmative remedies should be the responsibility of the executive and legislative
branches, which are more competent to make policy decisions." 7
However, the historic dearth of broad injunctions proscribing the conduct of
public institutions at common law may simply reflect the fact that such remedies
evolved in more recent times as necessary remedies to address complex problems
of constitutional violations unknown to English chancery courts.2 1
More
importantly, the critics are mistaken with respect to their historical understanding
of equity. As John Kroger carefully detailed in his work, Supreme Court Equity,
1789-1835, and the History ofAmerican Judging,the type of equity power existing
in the English chancery courts and the American colonial courts in the years leading
up to the time of the Constitutional Convention was a broad, unbounded type of
equitable power.2" 9 Traditional equity up until 1760 was defined as judicial power
based on the individual chancellor's notion of fairness and justice emanating from
natural law unconstrained by precedent or procedure.22 This was the type of equity
power the Anti-Federalists feared because it would be unconstrained by rules of
decision interpreting the Constitution.2 ' Hamilton allayed the fears of the Anti(questioning the courts'
competency and ability to make social policy decisions inherent in structural relief); Sturm,
supra note 72, at 1406-08 (summarizing the competency criticisms ofbroad injunctive relief
217

DONALD HoROwrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIALPOLICY (1977)

in public law litigation); Yoo, supra note 214, at 1137-38 (arguing that courts are

structurally worse off than other arms of government at developing intellectually coherent
solutions to social problems because they must conduct social fact-finding and address the
political, economic, and social factors that may have created the unconstitutional condition).
218 For a view that structural injunctions are not in fact new, see Theodore Eisenberg
&
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation, 93
HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) (arguing that judicial supervision of complex enterprises has
historic roots in probate, trust, and bankruptcy law).
219 John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of American
Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1434-38 (1998); see also PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE
LAW'S CONSCIENCE 47 (1990) (describing the unbounded use ofequity by American colonial
courts).
220 Kroger, supra note 219, at 1434-35.
221 "Brutus" XI, The Supreme Court: They Will Mould the Government Into Almost Any

Shape TheyPlease,N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprintedin 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 129,
132 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) ("[I]n their decisions they will not confine themselves to any
fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason
and spirit of the constitution."); "Brutus" XII, On the Power ofthe Supreme Court:Nothing
Can Stand Before It, N.Y.J., Feb. 7 & 14, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra at 171, 173 (arguing that the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction to
federal courts over cases in "law and equity" empowered courts "to give the constitution a
construction according to its spirit and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter");

see also Yoo, supra note 214, at 1152-53 (discussing the early American historical debate
over equity). Interestingly, however, this traditional type of unbounded equity power
pervaded the U.S. Supreme Court during its first decade. Kroger, supra note 219, at
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Federalists by subscribing to the modem equitable tradition advocated by
Blackstone, in which traditional equity would be constrained by precedent and
procedure.22 2 Hamilton, however, did not view equity as limited, but rather as
encompassing virtually any case: "There is hardly a subject of litigation between
individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust or
hardship, which would render the matter an object of equitable than of legal
jurisdiction.... 2 3 Thus, the Framers did not eliminate the ability of judges to
respond to violations of law with flexible and broad equitable remedies but merely
incorporated such equitable power into the normal judicial decisionmakingprocess.
Thus, prophylactic remedies like those in Miranda and Bush v. Gore are
legitimate uses of a court's judicial power to effectuate and interpret legal rights.
The remedial nature of the prophylactic answers questions of judicial authority to
impose prophylactics. For while it is generally the role of the legislative and
executive branches to manage institutions and prescribe rules of behavior, that role
becomes judicial when the court is acting in a remedial posture to correct
derelictions of those responsibilities by the political branches resulting in a
violation of law.224 Justice Scalia himself acknowledged this role transference: "Of
course, the two roles briefly and partially coincide when a court, in granting relief
against actual harm that has been suffered, or that will imminently be suffered, by
a particular individual or class of individuals, orders the alteration of an institutional
organization or procedure that causes the harm."22 What may still be unclear,
however, is how such individualized relief appears to impact individuals and
1440-46.
222

THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, supra note 203, at 502, 510 (Alexander Hamilton) ("To avoid

an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by

strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them .... ."); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 203, at 538, 549
(Alexander Hamilton) ("The great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in
extraordinarycases .... ); id. at 549 n.* ("[T]he principles by which that relief is governed
are now reduced to a regular system.... ."); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 129
concurring) (noting that Hamilton argued, as had Blackstone, that equity
(1995) (Thomas, J.,
should be limited by rules and established judicial practices); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *432 ("[E]quity is a laboured connected system, governed by established

rules, and bound down by precedents, from which they do not depart, although the reason of
some of them may perhaps be liable to objection."); Kroger, supra note 219, at 1436

(describing the modem reform of traditional equity as that which began to "legalize" equity
by standardizing procedure and adopting stare decisis in place of discretionary and natural
law-based adjudication).

80, supra note 203, at 520 (Alexander Hamilton).
Sturm, supra note 72, at 1406 (arguing that the critique of structural remedies as being

223 THE FEDERALIST No.
224

an abuse ofjudicial power "fails to account for the widely accepted judicial role ofproviding
remedies for legal wrongs").
225 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).
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institutions outside the litigation. A complete acceptance of the legitimacy of
prophylactic remedies therefore necessitates an understanding that prophylactics,
like other judicial actions, have precedential effects.
3. The Mirage of Prophylactic Effects
The confusion surrounding prophylactic remedies and their legitimacy stems
from the misunderstood legal effects of remedies. It is argued that prophylactics
create new actionable rights and establish irrebutable evidentiary burdens.226 Yet
the mirage of judicial rights and rules is simply the normal resulting effect of a
judicial remedial decision.227 For after the imposition of a remedy in the individual
case, that remedy becomes a rule of law with precedential value as with all judicial
decisions.2 2 It is this precedential value and its operational effects that have
distracted the courts and commentators from a firm understanding of prophylactics.
And thus, it is important to understand how prophylactics can in fact portray these
right and rule-like attributes.
A remedy evolves through the case law from an individual binding law into a
guide for subsequent cases. The prophylactic remedy begins as a new requirement
that binds a particular individual because it is an equitable order that acts in
personam upon the defendant.229 In this way, the prophylactic measures can fairly
be said to impose a new code of conduct upon the particular defendants. The
conduct is enforceable by the individual plaintiffs through the contempt power or
other enforcement actions.23 °
In subsequent cases, the court's prior imposition of a remedy becomes a rule or
legal principle directing the internal decisional process of the court. If it encounters
similar violations, such as race discrimination akin to that in the initial case, stare
decisis dictates that the court use the prior remedy as a precedent to direct it to
impose the same remedy, such as busing, in the case before it. Of course, stare
decisis also allows a court to deviate from the prior legal principles based upon

226

Cassell Brief,supra note 125; Grano, supra note 121, at 105.

Thomas, supra note 68, at 749 ("A prophylactic remedy is a rule of decision regarding
the remedial component of a definitional constitutional guarantee.").
228 Rule of law means a legal principle of general application sanctioned by the
recognition of authorities. It is called a "rule," because in doubtful or unforeseen cases it is
a guide for judicial decisions. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1196 (5th ed. 1979).
229 LAYCOCK, supra note 45.
230 Plaintiffs are able to seek criminal or civil contempt remedies for violations. Int'l
Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). Where civil compensatory
remedies are not available, a plaintiff may bring a new action for damages to compensate for
losses stemming from the defendant's failure to comply with the new mandated conduct.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 147 (2d ed. Supp. 1999).
227
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different facts or other policy decisions."' Thus, courts do not always require
uniform conformance to prior prophylactic remedies issued in unrelated cases;
rather, they permit political bodies to provide equally effective substitute
measures. 232 However, the prophylactic remedy may provide a shorthand way of
assessing violations because it provides concrete measures of otherwise abstract
principles. In this way, prophylactic remedies in subsequent cases may operate as
safe harbors insulating defendants from liability2 33 or as detection standards to
234
uncover illegality.
The important point is that, contrary to the current understanding, the
prophylactic remedy itself never becomes an actionable right. There is a clear
distinction between the remedy and what has been called the "right" or the
substantive guarantee. The guarantee establishes the legal duty or principle that
may be sued upon in a legal action. The remedy is the judicial policy response to
a finding of a violation of the guarantee. While the right/remedy or principle/policy
connection is unified, the two components are still distinct matter. 235 Thus, a cause
of action must always be based upon injury caused by a denial of a right, not due
to failure to comply with prophylactic measures.2 3
There are numerous cases exemplifying the precedential effects of the
prophylactic remedy. One of the earliest examples comes from the desegregation

Cf. Klein, supra note 141, at 482-83 (recognizing that necessary or appropriate
remedies for constitutional violations, like prophylactic remedies, may change with
circumstances).
232 See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 263.
233 Klein, supra note 127, at 1033, 1044 (defining a "safe harbor rule" as a judicially
created procedure that if properly followed by the government actor insulates the government
from argument that the constitutional right was violated); e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc.,
527 U.S. 526 (1999) (establishing a safe harbor for employers against imposition ofpunitive
damages for sexual harassment by complying with prophylactic measures of adopting antiharassment policies); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (stating that
employer has an affirmative defense to claim of vicarious liability for sexual harassment
where the employer has promulgated an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure
thereby demonstrating that it took reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment).
231

Caminker, supra note 125; Klein, supra note 127, at 1037.
Thomas, supra note 68, at 688-89; see also Levinson, supra note 169, at 872 (stating
that Ronald Dworkin's famous distinction between principle and policy roughly equates with
the difference between right and remedy).
236 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (denying an action brought for failure to
comply with an administrative agency's prophylactic remedial measure rather than for injury
to federal right against discrimination); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (denying a
claim based upon failure to comply with the prophylactic remedy of an Anders brief where
there was no constitutional injury); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (denying a claim
based o6 failure to provide prison law library because a library was not a freestanding right
but rather a prophylactic remedy issued in a prior case).
234
235
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23 7
cases. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
the Court
initially imposed busing as a required remedial measure for the racially segregated
schools. The Court found busing necessary as a protective measure to prevent
future segregation in the schools that might continue even after the cessation of
mandatory segregation due to the residential segregation.238 In this way, the Court
could be said to create a new right to busing for students in that county as the
county's failure to bus would be actionable.239 Subsequent courts then used the
remedial precedent of Swann and its busing remedy to guide them in crafting similar
transportation remedies for like constitutional violations caused by segregated
schools.24 In this way, the busing remedies that addressed the social and economic
causes of educational segregation redefined the scope of the equal protection
guarantee into a de facto rather than a de jure right.24' However, busing itself did
not become a new right.242
A second example of the effects of a prophylactic remedy is found in the prison
law library cases. In Bounds v. Smith,243 the Supreme Court ordered North Carolina
to provide adequate prison law libraries to prevent the denial of the prisoners' right
to meaningful access to the courts." The Court explicitly stated that, while law
libraries are one acceptable method to assure the right to access the courts, their
permissibility does not foreclose alternative measures such as legal assistance to the
prisoners from lawyers, law students, or other trained inmates.245 In other words,

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 30.
239 See N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971)
(invalidating North
Carolina's Anti-Busing Law prohibiting student busing for racial integration because the law
prevented implementation of busing determined to be required for Charlotte-Mecklenberg
schools under the Fourteenth Amendment).
240 E.g., United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Ind.
1979), afjfd
in relevantpart, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980); Mims v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 329 F.
Supp. 123, 130-31 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
24 Levinson, supra note 169, at 875-78.
242 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 492 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Certainly there is no constitutional duty to adopt mandatory busing in the absence of such
a [constitutional] violation."); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 47 (Cal. 1976)
(citations omitted):
While critics have sometimes attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions
time and time again emphasized that "busing" is not a constitutional end in itself
but is simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's
constitutional obligation in this field .... [I]n some circumstances busing will
be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in other
instances its "costs," both in financial and educational terms, will render its use
inadvisable.
243 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
244 Id. at 828.
241 Id. at 830-32.
237

238
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states and legislatures are free to provide substitute measures that equally protect
the right to access the courts.246 Twenty years later in Lewis v. Casey,247 prisoners
attempted to sue Arizona for its failure to provide an adequate law library.24 The
Court took this opportunity to clarify the difference between a remedy and a right.
It stated that a remedial means for ensuring a right, like the prison law library, does
not convert into a freestanding actionable right.249 Thus, a cause of action must be
based on actual injury to the established right to access the court, not failure to
comply with remedial measures imposed against a third-party. 250 The Lewis Court
thus reigned in the attempt to elevate the prophylactic remedy of the law library to
the status of a judicial right.
In yet another example, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Robbins"' did not
require strict compliance with its prophylactic measures established thirty years
earlier in Anders v. California252 requiring an attorney to file a brief detailing the
absence of meritorious claims before withdrawing from representation.253 The
Smith Court expressly stated that the Anders procedure was a prophylactic measure
to protect against harm, not a right in and of itself.254 Thus, the Court could
distinguish the remedial precedent based upon the facts of the case. In the Smith
case, counsel had complied with California's own withdrawal procedures, which
the Court found to be equally effective at protecting against constitutional harm. 2"
The Court emphasized how it as a court could not impose a single rule upon the
states to prevent the denial of counsel, and that instead, it encouraged the states to
experiment with solutions to difficult questions of policy.256
The penultimate example of the evolutionary effects of a prophylactic remedy
is the mysterious Miranda that has confounded critics and their analysis of
prophylaxis. Mirandais often used as an example of how prophylactics create new
rights. 257 However, the mirage that failure to comply with the warnings triggers
liability is simply the operation of the precedential effect of the Miranda decision.
The Court initially imposed the four required warnings to protect against further
constitutional violations by the named police departments.2 8" These particular
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

See id.

518 U.S. 343 (1996).
Id. at 346.
Id. at351.
Id. at 349-59.
528 U.S. 259 (2000).
386 U.S. 738 (1967).

255

Smith, 528 U.S. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 286-87.

256

Id. at 272-74.

257

E.g., Grano, supra note 121, at 100-05.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-78 (1966).

253
254

21
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departments were then bound to comply with these warnings. In subsequent cases,
the Court used this remedial decision to guide its resolution of the disputes. Since
detection of coerced confessions is difficult to prove, the Court used the police's
failure to comply with the prescribed preventive measures as evidence of a
violation. The failure of the police to comply with the protections dictated by prior
cases to avoid coercion becomes strong, almost conclusive evidence that the
constitutional violation was not avoided.259 Thus, as commentators have noted, the
prophylactic remedy of Miranda can sometimes operate as a detection standard or
evidentiary rule.26
However, as the Court has repeatedly stated, Miranda rights are "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution." '' Accordingly, the Court has not
always required that defendants comply with the warnings as in the cases approving
the use of non-Mirandized confessions in impeachment or as justified by public
safety.262 And it has invited state and federal lawmakers to provide equally
effective substitutes for its prophylactic remedy.263 Such distinctions are simply the
normal evolution of a remedial precedent; the continued use and binding effect of
a remedy are based upon case-by-case analysis in accordance with the usual judicial
decisionmaking.
This same remedial evolution is likely to be seen with respect to the
prophylactic remedy of Bush v. Gore. Despite the Court's attempt to limit its
decision to the unique facts of the case, the decision will operate in the normal
precedential manner to require the same such protective measures in future recounts
by other actors.264 There are two different directions in which this remedial
E.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 ("Miranda'spreventive medicine provides
a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm."). And
this circumstantial evidence may also prove insufficient to find a constitutional violation in
the absence of other evidence of the involuntariness of the confession and in the face of
countervailing concerns.
260 Cassell Brief supra note 125; Caminker, supra 125; Klein, supra note 127.
261 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
444 (1974); see also Steve D. Clymer, Are PoliceFreeto DisregardMiranda,112 YALE L.J.
447 (2002) ("This understanding.... has received scant attention in the extensive Miranda
literature ....Police disregard of Miranda is not a constitutional wrong.").
262 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653 (recognizing a public safety exception to compliance with
Miranda warnings); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that
evidence obtained in violation ofMirandais admissible for impeachment); see also Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (holding that a violation of Mirandadoes not require
suppression of evidence obtained as result of that confession).
263 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442, 44-45, 467; Dorf & Friedman, supra note 140, at 61
(arguing that after Dickerson there is still a role for Congress and the States to share in the
constitutional interpretation if Congress provides procedural safeguards adequate to ensure
the constitutional right).
264 The Court's attempt to eliminate the precedential value of the case by limiting it to the
unique facts before it is meaningless as every case technically is limited to the specific facts
259
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precedent could impact the law. First, the precedent may bind future election cases
mandating that similar steps be followed in any state recount. The Bush Court used
language that these four steps were minimally necessary to protect against arbitrary
treatment.2 65 Thus, like Miranda, but unlike Anders, the Bush recount measures
may provide a minimum flooring required in all recounts to avoid equal protection
violations.26 6 Already, there have been concerns that these minimum safeguards are
too burdensome and may practically eliminate the use of election recounts. 2 67 The
second potential precedential effect of the remedial decision in Bush v. Gore is that
it may direct the Supreme Court to impose similar prophylactic relief rather than a
simple preventive order in similar cases of arbitrary treatment. Thus, Bush v. Gore
may stand for the proposition that more rather than less relief is required in
2 68
instances of constitutional violations.

m. ABUSE OF THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY
The remedial decision in Bush v. Gore therefore is not illegitimate or
extraordinary simply because it imposed a prophylactic remedy to redress a
constitutional violation. The remedial decision is suspect, however, because of the
Court's choice of this powerful remedy in this particular case. The Court abused
its power to impose a prophylactic remedy in this case in two ways. First, the
prophylaxis was unnecessary and inappropriately tailored under the Court's guiding
standards for issuing such extraordinary relief. Second, the Bush Court used its
before it, but the rule of law will be applied to similar cases in the future.
265 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109-10 (per curiam):
[T]here must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of
equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.... The State has not
shown that its procedures include the necessary safeguards.... [T]he recount
cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection
and due process without substantial additional work.
266 Id.at 110.
267 See Gore v.

Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 529, 531 (Fla. 2000); Steven J. Mulroy, Right
Without a Remedy? The "Butterfly Ballot" Case and Court-OrderedFederal Election
"Revotes," 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 215 (2001).
268 Thus, in contrast to what Professor Karlan has argued, Bush v. Goredoes not represent
a case of the so-called leveling down of constitutional rights in which the desired benefit is
denied to all rather than extended to the excluded class. Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal
Protection:Regressive Doctrineon a ChangeableCourt, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE &THE
SUPREME COURT, supranote 3, at 85 (2001). The classic leveling down case is that in which
the city of Jackson, Mississippi closed down its public pools for all citizens rather than
granting access to African-American citizens. Karlan, supra at 89. In contrast, the
prophylactic remedy in Bush v. Goreextends the recount benefits to all voters equally. It was
only the Court's imposition of the safe harbor deadline purportedly mandated by state law
that operated to deny the recount benefit to voters.
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remedial equity power to preclude rather than ensure relief. It created a remedial
facade that was never meant to prevent or redress harm and which actually created
further harm of the same type for which it chastised the Florida court.2 69 For by
denying all recounts, the Supreme Court arbitrarily denied the fundamental right to
vote of Florida voters who cast a legal vote not counted by the tabulation systems.27 °
It was this harm to voters, not to a particular candidate, that the Florida court
initially set out to correct, but which the U.S. Supreme Court exacerbated by its
inappropriate use ofthe prophylactic remedy. Such an arbitrary use of equity power
by the Supreme Court, and indeed by some of the most vocal judicial opponents of
equitable remedies, casts suspicion upon the legitimacy of the remedy while at the
same time providing potential ammunition for the use of these powerful
prophylactic remedies in future cases.
A. The Unnecessaryand UntailoredRemedy of Bush v. Gore
In addition to accusations of illegitimacy, prophylactic remedies are often
criticized as overprotecting legal rights.271 Critics assert that prophylactics
269

As Professor Karlan has explained:
In the end, the decision to stop the recount had virtually nothing to do with equal
protection. It vindicated no identifiable voter's interests. The form of equality
it created was empty: it treated all voters whose ballots had not already been
tabulated the same, by denying any of them the ability to have his ballot counted.
And its remedy perpetuated other forms of inequality that were far more severe:
between voters whose ballots were counted by the machine count and voters
whose ballots were not, and even between voters in counties that performed
timely manual recounts (like Volusia and Broward) and voters in other counties.

Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial:The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment in
Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 587, 600 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also Posner,

supra note 3, at 48 (arguing that by terminating the recount the Supreme Court provided no
relief to voters whose votes had not been counted, thereby denying equal protection to voters
in the same way it had just invalidated); Radin, supra note 110, at 118 (criticizing the

deplorable way in which the Supreme Court created the very kind ofharm it purported to find
by denying equal treatment to voters whose intent would have been clear in a recount).
270 E.g., Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. 11. 2002) (upholding on
summary judgment a claim that punch card machines violate equal protection); see also
Joyce Baugh, Bush v. Gore and EqualProtection:A Unique Case?, in THE FINAL ARBITER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH v. GoRE IN LAW AND POLITICS (forthcoming SUNY
Press) (discussing four voting cases brought in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore alleging equal
protection violations from faulty voting systems); B.J. Palermo, Suits Push 3 States to End
Punch Card Voting, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 4, 2002, at Al (discussing equal protection cases
brought by voters in California, Florida, Georgia, and Illinois).
271 Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (Trott, J., dissenting) ("Like
all prophylactic rules, the Miranda rule 'overprotects' the value at stake."), cert. denied,502
U.S. 868 (1991); Cassell, supra note 66, at 905 (arguing that Miranda's automatic rule

"overprotects" a constitutional right: "Overprotection means protection beyond what the
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"overprotect" rights by giving greater protection to individuals than the rights, as
abstractly understood, would seem to require. 272 But as Professor Schoenbrod
explained nearly thirty years ago, prophylactic relief does not overprotect, but
rather, it precisely protects legal rights. 273 The right level of protection commonly
accepted for injunctive remedies is the return of the plaintiff to her rightful position,
that is, the position she would have been in but for the wrong. 274 The prophylactic
remedy aims at precisely this rightful position but adopts broader measures in order
to accomplish this same purpose. 275 These broader measures are used when
necessary to achieve the requisite level of protection because other narrower
remedies are ineffective due, for example, to the inability to craft an injunction to
address the harm or the defendant's ability to evade a simple prohibition. 7 6
Thus, it is not true'that every prophylactic remedy is inherently excessive
Constitution requires."); Klein, supra note 127, at 1033 (distinguishing prophylactic rules
as those which overprotect constitutional rights); Landsberg, supra note 46, at 969.
272 Caminker, supra note 125, at 28 n.91 (stating that constitutional law scholars have long
observed that many doctrinal rules deemed to be prophylactic rules, established by courts to
protect constitutional rights, seem to overprotect those rights, but arguing that this common
pejorative characterization ofprophylactic rules should end because it wrongly assumes some
natural baseline of lesser protection); Lansberg, supra note 46, at 969. For example, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1997 reacted to this perception of overprotection from
remedies in prison litigation by limiting courts in cases about prison conditions to imposing
only that prospective relief which is the minimum necessary to correct the legal violation.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).
273 SCHOENBROD supra note 46, at 131; Schoenbrod, supra note 46, at 678-79.
274 There seems to be consensus that the rightful position is one proper goal of equitable
relief. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,

746 (1974). In addition, there is a second judicial goal of equitable discretion that the court
has articulated as a permissible goal to achieve overall fairness beyond the plaintiffs rightful
position. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The prophylactic remedy is even more defensible as not
overprotective under this remedial goal. See LAYCOCK, supra note 45 (arguing that an
equitable discretion case could be justified as an adoption ofprophylactic remedy); Lansberg,
supra note 46, at 936 (stating that the prophylactic injunction is grounded in equity which
the Supreme Court described in Brown v. BoardofEducationas "characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and
private needs").
275

276

Schoenbrod, supra note 46, at 678-79; see also Thomas, supra note 68, at 723.
Schoenbrod, supra note 46, at 679-80; see also Landsberg, supra note 46, at 929

(stating that prophylactics are designed to correct for the ineffectiveness of more direct
prohibitions that stems from the human tendency to stretch compliance with core rules and
from the difficulties of detecting and punishing violations of core rights); Sturm, supra note
72, at 1362-63 ("Courts correctly perceive, either initially or after years of noncompliance
that the underlying causes of the legal violation disable the defendants from complying with
a general directive to cease violating the law.") (footnote omitted).
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simply due to its breadth. However, prophylactic remedies may be improper when
they are crafted in an untailored manner that exceeds the boundaries of the court's
remedial authority. 77 For if the judicial decision imposing required conduct is not
tailored to the legal violation, then the court is not performing its judicial function
of reacting to prevent or correct harm, but rather it is prescribing new codes of
conduct and rights. Such judicial action leads directly back to the old claim of the
illegitimacy of prophylactics.27
The use of prophylactic remedies in the First Amendment arena demonstrates
the concern with properly tailoring the prophylactic measures.279 A common mantra
in First Amendment jurisprudence is that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of
free expression are suspect."28 This mantra does not identify an inherent
legitimacy problem with prophylactic remedies but rather signifies a tailoring
problem created by an improperly designed prophylactic.'
As previously
discussed, prophylactic remedies proscribe conduct that is not illegal. In the area
of First Amendment law, prophylactic relief encompasses not only legal conduct,
but also special'constitutionally protected conduct. Thus, the lesser-cited second
Thomas, supra note 68, at 727-28; e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (finding
prophylactic measures addressing the prison library not tailored to the harm).
278 Estes v. Metro. Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 444 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari) ("The constitutional deprivation must be
identified accurately, and the remedy must be related closely to that deprivation. Otherwise,
a desegregation order may exceed both the power and the competence of courts."); Sturm,
supra note 72, at 1408-09 (summarizing the argument that broad injunctive remedies
constitute an abuse ofjudicial power where there is no demonstrable relationship between
the legal violation and the remedy imposed); Thomas, supra note 68, at 734 (stating that
commentators have argued that divergence ofa remedy from its proper proportionality would
violate an inherent limitation upon judicial power by engaging in legislation); cf Lewis, 518
U,S. at 357 (stating that failure to restrict the judicial remedy to the inadequacy that produced
the established injury in fact would not serve the purpose of preventing courts from
undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches).
277

279

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991)

(describing a prophylactic theory of First Amendment overbreadth in which the issue is not
the permissibility of the prophylaxis but rather its desirability and shape); cf. Daniel P.
Tokaji, PoliticalEquality After Bush v. Gore: A FirstAmendment Approach to Voting
Rights, in THE FINALARBITER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE IN LAW AND

POLrrIcs (forthcoming SUNY Press) (arguing that the political equality holding of Bush v.
Gore as to merits, standing, and remedy can be best understood in the light of First
Amendment doctrine).
280 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
759-62 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (berating the Colorado criminal law prohibiting

approaching another person within eight feet of a healthcare facility as a "prophylactic
measure" whose constitutional infirmity was its overbreadth).
281 Hill, 530 U.S. at 762 (Scalia., J., dissenting) ("Prophylaxis is the antithesis of narrow
tailoring....").
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part of the infamous mantra is that "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone
in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."2" 2 Precision is a
requirement because prophylactic relief that is excessive poses a counter-risk of
violating the defendant's rights.2" 3 For example, a total ban on protests outside of
abortion clinics would violate the protestor's freedom of political speech, whereas
a ban on protests within thirty-six feet of the clinic is a tailored remedy that
accommodates the defendant's First Amendment rights.284
The Bush v. Gore remedy exemplifies an improper remedy that is not tailored
to the violation. The Supreme Court's prior decisions reveal several important
factors that have guided its use of remedial discretion to impose prophylactic
remedies,285 yet none of these factors dictate the application of that remedy in the
context of Bush v. Gore. A properly tailored injunction, the Supreme Court has
held, is one whose nature and scope are proportional to the nature and scope of the
violation.2 86 With respect to prophylactic relief, the Court has found that the broad
nature of the prophylaxis is appropriate where (1) the legal harm is egregious, and
(2) other remedies are ineffective to prevent or correct that harm.287 In addition, the
Court has found the scope of prophylactic measures to be properly tailored where
those measures (3) address conduct causally connected to the proven harm, and (4)
balance the defendants' competing interests.288 Virtually all of these four required
factors are missing in the Bush v. Gore case, thereby casting suspicion upon the
validity of the ratcheted-up remedy.
Egregious Harm: First, the Court has utilized the powerfully broad
prophylactic remedy only to address egregious types of harm. Such harms are
usually more than a mere violation of a constitutional right and include threats of
personal assault or restriction of personal freedom through imprisonment.2 89 In the
Button, 371 U.S. at 438.
Landsberg, supra note 46, at 968-69.
284 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding a 36-foot buffer zone
around abortion clinic in which protests were prohibited but striking down a 300-foot buffer
zone around staffresidences); see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997)
(allowing a 15-foot buffer zone).
285 See Landsberg, supranote 46, at 963-72 (proposing principles for prophylactic rules).
286 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88
(1995); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,744-47 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971).
287 E.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753; Swann, 402 U.S. at 14.
288 E.g., Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280-81 (1977) (holding that federal remedies must "take
into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs" and that
remedy may include conditions which are a consequence of a constitutional violation);
Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 ("In default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer
acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy ....).
289 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759,767-68 (issuing a prophylactic remedy to protect health and
safety of women and to protect against personal assault); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 357; Women
282
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WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:343

related context of prophylactic remedial measures crafted by the legislature, the
Court has said: "The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in
light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may
be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one."29 What is the egregious harm
in Bush v. Gore? Perhaps it is the impending constitutional crisis over the failure
to elect a president. 29 I However, that was not the legal harm presented to the Court
that the Court was empowered to correct. Indeed, that type of political crisis is
intended to be resolved through the political rather than the legal process.292
So perhaps, as has been suggested, the egregious harm is the wildly partisan
behavior of the Florida Supreme Court that the U.S. Supreme Court needed to
harshly curtail. 293 However, the Florida Court did nothing out of the ordinary. In
fact, it acted quite conservatively in closely following the dictates of its recentlyenacted state law.294 In Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, the U.S.
Supreme Court admonished the Florida Court that Article II requires that the state
electors be determined as the legislators intended and that it was prohibited from
altering that process.29 Acting cautiously in light of this admonition, the Florida

Prisoners v. Dist. of Columbia, 968 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1994) (imposing prophylactic
measures to prevent repeated sexual assaults and rapes of female inmates); cf.Landsberg,
supra note 46, at 965 (advocating a principle for establishing prophylactic rules based upon
evidence of need).
290 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (citations omitted); see also Kirnel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Thomas, supra note 68, at 733 (stating that the
Family Medical Leave Act exemplifies that Section 5's grant ofprophylactic remedial power
is quite broad and empowers Congress to enact strong responses to persistent constitutional
problems).

Posner, supranote 3, at 46. But see Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 245-46 (disagreeing
that there was a "constitutional crisis" or dispute between coequal branches of the
government, and finding that there was merely a dispute that would have been resolved, by
legislative and statutory means).
292 Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decisionto Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, ALND
291

THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 38.
293

Lund, supra note 3, at 1272 (claiming that the Florida Supreme Court grossly violated

the law and "proved to be highly aggressive and irresponsible in dealing with federal law");

Posner, supra note 3, at 48 ("[T]he remedy decreed by the five-Justice majority has a
"gotcha!" flavor, as if the U.S. Supreme Court had outsmarted the Florida supreme court.
. .."). But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 135-36 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist that the Florida Supreme Court had "veered so far
from the ordinary practice of judicial review that what it did cannot properly be called
judging" and arguing that "[tihere is no cause here to believe that the members of Florida's
high court have done less than 'their mortal best to discharge their oath of office').
294 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248-50 (Fla.) (per curiam) (discussing recent
revisions to Florida election law made by legislature in 1999), rev'dper curiam sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
29' Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) (per curiara).
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Supreme Court adhered to Florida statutory law in crafting its recount remedy in the
contest phase. 96 The Florida legislature granted to the state courts the sole
discretion to decide remedies for contest violations.297 In assuming this
responsibility, the court adopted a manual recount remedy akin to the recount
remedy expressly provided by state law as a protest remedy. 8 The Florida
Supreme Court then used the legislature's own recount standard of the voter's
intent."'
It is ironic that the Florida court has been accused of illicit behavior and
unseemly motives simply for conforming its actions to state law. Indeed, it was the
statutory law itself that initially was alleged to be the constitutional infirmity. In
Siegel v. LePore and Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, Governor
Bush argued that the selective nature of the protest recounts and the lack of a
uniform legal vote standard rendered the legislative enactments unconstitutional. 0 0
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court's adherence to this problematic statutory law may
then have been incorrect, but it cannot be said to be egregiously unethical or
partisan as has been claimed.
Inadequacy ofOtherRemedies: Second, the Court has used prophylactics when
other remedies are inadequate because the alternatives cannot effectively prevent
the harm."' For example, narrower preventive remedies like "Do not harass" may
296 Gore, 772

So. 2d at 1248 ("This case today is controlled by the language set forth by
the Legislature.").
297 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (2000) (amended 2001); Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1254
("Through this statute, the Legislature has granted trial courts broad authority to resolve
election disputes and fashion appropriate relief.").
298 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5)(c) (2000) (amended 2001).
299 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1262 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5)). Indeed, fourteen
other states use this same standard of the "intent of the voter" for ballot recounts. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 141 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying Arizona, Connecticut,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, Wyoming as using the "intent" standard).
" Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Siegel v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000) (mem.) (No.
00-837) (presenting the sole question of whether the use of selective, arbitrary and
standardless manual recounts violated equal protection, due process, and the First
Amendment); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836) (presenting the same question as last of three questions
presented). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari on the equal protection
issue the first time Bush raised the issue. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
301 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994) (finding broader
prophylactic remedy necessary due to failure of defendants to obey prior prohibitory order);
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 714 n.2 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disapproving
prophylactic remedy approved by Court but suggesting that such a remedy might be justified
where state officials have been shown to have violated previous remedial orders); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prophylactic warnings needed because police could easily
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be ineffective if the defendants have previously disobeyed these orders or if they
can easily evade detection for violation of the order. 0 2 However, there was no
evidence in Bush v. Gore that other more narrow remedies would have been
inadequate to prevent the constitutional harm. Indeed, as the dissenting U.S.
Supreme Court Justices argued, a simple prohibition against the arbitrary recount
would have sufficed.3" 3 Or if a more affirmative injunction was preferable, the
Court could have required the Florida Court to adopt a uniform standard for the
recount. The case exhibited none of the evidence presented in previous cases in
which the prior default of the defendants of simple prohibitions mandated secondary
remedies of broader prophylactics."0 4 Nor did the Bush v. Gore case present a
chance that the Florida Court would evade detection for violating a simple
prohibition against the arbitrary recount because the entire nation and the media
were focused on every move of the state court. The absence of other ineffective
remedies should have directed the Court away from the broad prophylactic as
advocated by the four dissenters.
Causally Connected Measures: Third, the Court has approved as properly
tailored only those prophylactics that incorporate measures that are causally
evade a simple order prohibiting coerced confessions); SCHOENBROD supra note 46, at 131
(indicating that broader prophylactic remedies are needed when other narrower injunctions
are inadequate due to the inability to craft a precise prohibition or the ability of the defendant
to evade detection for violating the injunction).
302 E.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770, 776 (upholding prophylactic injunction after failure of
simple injunction prohibiting and blockading and assaults); Neal v. Dir., D.C. Dep't of Corr.,
1995 WL 517244, at *2 (D.D.C. 1995):
The need for extensive mandatory relief is even greater here because the
Department has been subject to an injunction prohibiting sexual harassment for
14 years... and has nonetheless openly and wantonly continued to engage in a
widespread pattern of sexual harassment and retaliation. Nor has the defendants'
record of compliance with orders of this court barring retaliation against the
named plaintiffs and other witnesses been any better. Accordingly, the strongest
measures to address sexual harassment and retaliation at the Department of
Corrections are needed here.
See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 125 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Our
impatience with the pace of desegregation and with the lack of a good-faith effort on the part
of school boards led us to approve such extraordinary remedial measures."); Sturm, supra
note 72, at 1361-62 (stating that courts have generally viewed the negative injunction simply
prohibiting illegal conduct as inadequate for most public law violations, providing the
example ofa general order prohibiting unequal treatment ofblack and white school children,
which provided no indication ofhow to rectify the social conditions, behavioral patterns, and
organizational dynamics causing the harm).
303 See supra text accompanying note 74.
31 See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402
U.S. 1, 14 (discussing dilatory tactics of many school authorities in complying with
obligation to end racial segregation as justifying broader equitable remedies).
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connected to the harm. a°5 For example, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court struck down
a prophylactic injunction that adopted onerous measures regulating every aspect of
Arizona's prison law libraries because it addressed facets such as noise, lighting,
and employee training that were not causally related to the denial of access to the
courts to two illiterate prisoners.306 The Court in Hutto v. Finney,on the other hand,
upheld the prophylactic measure prohibiting punitive isolation in a state prison
because it found that the isolation causally contributed to Eighth Amendment
violations such as the denial of food to prisoners." 7
By contrast, the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore ordered a variety of recount
measures that are causally disconnected from the harm of the arbitrary recount
standard. The equal protection violation found by seven Justices was the lack of a
uniform standard for determining a legal vote.30 8 Only part of the first ordered
remedial measure vaguely addresses this harm by requiring the adoption of
"adequate statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote."3 9 Indeed, the
measure itself does not even mandate a uniform standard, but rather an "adequate"
one. Several of the other ordered measures impose procedural requirements
involving inputs and review from multiple actors akin to a legislative or
administrative process.31 o In other words, the Supreme Court seemed to mandate
that recount standards during the contest phase come from the political rather than
thejudicial branches, despite the Florida legislature's contrary determination. Such
procedural measures are valid as a prophylactic remedy only if a cause of the
constitutional violation included the lack ofpolitical involvement. But the converse
is true. As discussed above, there was recent political involvement by the Florida
legislature which created the arbitrary legal vote standard and delegated the
remedial responsibility to the courts.3"' In addition, the Bush Court curiously
mandated executive review of tabulation software used to identify undervotes for
recount.312 This executive certification, however, is already provided for by Florida
law and nothing in the record demonstrated that the lack of certification contributed

Thomas, supra note 68, at 723 (stating that prophylactic relief may be directed at
ancillary conduct on either side of the violation including contributing causes and continuing
effects); cf Landsberg, supra note 46, at 964 (explaining that courts disfavor prophylactic
rules that are too remote from the original right the rule protects).
306 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.343, 361, 392 (1996).
307 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
308 Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000) (per curiam).
301 Id. at 110.
30 Id. at 109-110.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 294-99.
312 Bushv. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
305
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to the constitutional violation."' Furthermore, the Supreme Court suggests that
overvotes should be included in the recount, even though Gore never alleged that
overvotes were part of the election harm.3" 4 While there are a variety of features
that might be preferable in a perfectly designed recount process, those desirable
features are not the proper subject for prophylactic measures. 3 t5 As many members
of the Supreme Court have vociferously noted in the prison and desegregation
cases, the courts should not be in the business of designing ideal public systems
31 6
because they lack the competency and authority to make such decisions of policy.
Rather, courts should be restricted to remedying causes and consequences of proven
harms.
Competing Interests: Finally, the Court routinely considers the competing
interests of the defendants and the public when imposing prophylactic remedies.31 7
Because the prophylactic reaches legal conduct, the courts must ensure that proper
respect is given to intrusions upon conduct that has not violated the law. Thus, the
Court focuses on the counter-risks to the defendants and others in regulating
ancillary conduct by considering infringements on the defendants' rights, comity for
state actors,3" 8 and the opportunity for initial remediation.319 In Lewis v. Casey, for
313

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5)(b) (2000) (amended 2001) (providing that if the manual

recount in the protest phase indicates error in vote tabulation, the county canvassing board

has an option to request the Department of State to verify the tabulation software).
314

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's restriction

of overvotes that were not a part of the inadequacy causing the tabulation or equal protection
harm); id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Breyer regarding the
requirement of counting overvotes); Transcript of Oral Argument at *62-*63, Bush v. Gore,

531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (statement of David Boies, attorney for Vice President
Gore) (arguing that there is no legal basis for counting overvotes). But see McConnell, supra
note 3, at 657-58 (suggesting that the richest source of additional votes for Gore might have
been the "overvotes" in Republican-dominated counties using optical scanning vote systems).
311 So for example, in Harrisv. Conradi,675 F.2d 1212 (11 th Cir. 1982), the court denied
the request for prophylactic measures designed to prevent election fraud, such as the
appointment of poll watchers and bipartisan election officials, where those measures were
not addressing any cause or consequence of the proven harm. Id. at 1216 n.10 ("The
institution of prophylactic measures ... is a matter for consideration by state legislatures.
We simply hold that the Constitution does not require the states to take steps to remedy a
constitutional infirmity which does not exist.").
316 E.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,385-88 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,404-05 (1974).
317 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
318 See id. at 51 ("[A]lthough the 'remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate
to the task... they are not unlimited ....
[O]ne of the most important considerations
governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function
of local government institutions."') (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161
(1971)).
3 See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361-62 (declaring a prophylactic remedy invalid because the

district court failed to give adequate deference to the judgment of prison authorities regarding
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example, the trial court improperly tailored the prophylactic remedy by failing to
give the state prison administration the first opportunity to propose remedial action
and failing to give deference to its policy decisions on prison management and
security."'
The Bush Court neglected to consider any of the relevant competing interests
implicated by its imposition of a broad prophylactic remedy. First, it restricted the
ability of the Florida state court to perform its judicial duty of enforcing and
remedying state rights. The U.S. Supreme Court tied the state court's hands and
prevented it from crafting any relief for the violation of state law it had found.
Instead, the Court could have simply negated the unconstitutional recount and
remanded to the Florida court to permit it to fulfill its remedial obligation. Second,
the Court failed to consider the infringement its remedy created upon those Florida
" ' Indeed, it was
voters who did not have their vote counted due to tabulation error.32
this very concern of unequal treatment of voters that led the Florida Supreme Court
to impose a recount and to impose it statewide.322 Finally, the nullification of state
rights resulting from the federal remedy certainly does not exhibit the comity and

security and failed to provide a process required by comity for the states that gave the prison

authority the first opportunity to correct its own errors); Madsen v. Women's Heath Ctr., 512
U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (stating that all injunctions "should be no more burdensome to the
defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs" and holding that
prophylactic injunctions inappropriately intruded upon defendants' free speech rights);
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (stating "the general rule that remedies
should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not

unnecessarily infringe on competing interests"); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
(finding that a prophylactic busing remedy improperly ordered innocent third-party suburbs
to participate in the remedy); cf Landsberg, supra note 47, at 968-69 (advocating a principle
for establishing prophylactic rules that takes into account the risks to and interests of
defendants and third parties).
320 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361-62.
321 Radin, supra 110, at 120 (stating that equally deplorable to providing no remedy for
the constitutional harm was the way the Supreme Court created the very kind of harm it
purported to find by denying equal treatment to voters whose intent would have been clear

in a recount).
322 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254-55 (Fla. 2000)
("Relief would not be

'appropriate under [the] circumstances' if it failed to address the 'otherwise valid exercise

of the right of a citizen to vote' of all those citizens of this State who, being similarly situated,
have had their legal votes rejected.") (alteration in original); id. at 1253 ("[I]t is absolutely
essential ... that a manual recount be conducted for all legal votes in this State ... in all

Florida counties where there was an undervote, and hence a concern that not every citizen's
vote was counted."); id. at 1261 (holding that, because it is a statewide election, statewide
remedies are called for); see also Intervenor Matt Butler's Response to Plaintiffs
Memorandum Opposition to Motion to Intervene at 2-3, Gore v. Harris, Dec. 1, 2000

(arguing that selective recount rather than statewide recount violates equal protection),
available at http://www.election2000.standford.edu.
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respect for state actors that the Court has found paramount in crafting injunctions
against state actors.323 Moreover, the Supreme Court failed to adopt the process it
seemingly mandated in prior prophylactic cases of permitting the state court to have
the first opportunity to correct the constitutional infirmity.324 Again, a simple order
prohibiting the arbitrary recount would have given the state court the first
opportunity to fix the constitutional infirmity, thereby giving proper respect to the
state court's function and the state's election laws.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to tailor its prophylactic recount remedy
to the constitutional harm found reveals the invalidity of such a remedy. The Court
adopted a broad remedy without consideration of any of the factors it has previously
found necessary to properly choosing and designing such relief. The unprincipled
use of such an equitable remedy thus casts suspicion upon the Court's decision and
lends support to those who criticize the decision for deviating from the rule of law.
B. Misusing Equity

More fundamentally, the unguided and unprecedented adoption of the
prophylactic remedy in Bush v. Gore demonstrates an abuse ofthe Court's equitable
power. The prophylactic remedy in Bush v. Gore does not protect, much less
overprotect rights, because at the end of the day, no protective measures are
implemented. Indeed, the Court never intended the measures to become effective
since it also held in its decision that the safe harbor date precluded such practical
change.3 25 The prophylactic remedy, in contravention of its intended equitable
purpose, actually denies relief and thus weakens the definitional protections of the
voting and equal protection guarantees. The Court denies the right to vote to
Florida citizens whose votes were not tabulated due to error thereby creating the
very kind of harm it purported to find.326 It also denies the state right to redress for
such tabulation errors. The Bush decision's bottom line was that Florida was not
just prohibited from conducting an arbitrary recount; it was prohibited from
conducting any recount whatsoever.327 This judicial use of a prophylactic remedy
establishing a remedial facade with the purpose of barring rather than providing
relief constitutes a misuse of remedial power.
Ironically, claims ofjudicial excess usually accomlany broad injunctions that
323

See Harris v. Conradi, 675 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11 th Cir. 1982) (denying the requested

prophylactic relief in an election case inpart because "state has a substantial interest in the
management of its elections, and the procedure utilized in holding elections may not be
altered by federal courts unless state laws or practices violate federal statutes or the
Constitution.").
See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
326 Cf. Radin, supra note 110, at 120.
327 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
324
325
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restrict a variety of conduct in order to accomplish some ultimate goal of fairness
or justice. For example, broad injunctions mandating the integration of the races
or the humane treatment of prisoners have been criticized as social engineering or
judicial legislation.328 In contrast, the judicial excess in Bush v. Gore is used to
accomplish no larger social good or moral justice.329 Instead it is used to punish the
state court and prohibit the functioning of state law and judicial redress.
This unguided use of equity applied simply upon the whim of the judge is
reminiscent ofthe earliest notions of traditional equity at common law that the AntiFederalists feared in the establishment of one federal Supreme Court.3 The AntiFederalists were concerned that granting the federal courts equity power, ratherthan
constraining them as common law courts, would enable the Court to use its
equitable power to reinterpret constitutional rights and impose its will upon the
states, irrespective of the rule of law or precedent interpreting those constitutional
33

rights.

1

This fear has been realized in Bush v. Gore. The Supreme Court acted with
unfettered power under the guise of equity. The early chancery courts of England
utilized this type of unfettered equity characterized by the use of the judges'
individualized opinion, unconstrained by precedent or procedure. 32 The Bush
decision is a classic example of this unfettered equity. It imposed its equitable
prophylactic remedy unconstrained by the precedent and the guiding factors that
would have determined that broad remedy to be inappropriate. It acted without
regard to proper procedure, granting standing to Bush, a third-party, to challenge a
remedy imposed against the Florida executive at Gore's request.333 It depended
See James U. Blacksher, DredScott's Unwon Freedom: The RedistrictingCases As
Badges Of Slavery, 39 How. L.J. 633,652 (1996) ("The underlying assumption on both sides
of the familiar post-Brown debate over judicial activism versus judicial restraint and the rise
of the "social issue" is that the Warren Court did undertake a wide-ranging project of social
engineering."); Mary Cornelia Porter, State Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren
328

Court:Some Old Inquiriesfora New Situation, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS
INTHE FEDERAL SYSTEM 3, 17-18 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982) ("[A]

directive from the Supreme Court to redistrict or to bus children to achieve racial balance in
schools or a federal judge's assumption of responsibility to operate schools or prisons gives
rise to cries of'judicial legislation."'); Yoo, supra note 215.
329 Cf Rubenfeld, supra note 89, at 35-36 (arguing that the Bush v. Gore decision is
worse than Plessiv. Ferguson'supholding of racial segregation because Bush v. Goreis not

based even on an important constitutional principle or larger important issue).
330

See supra text accompanying notes 220-21.

331 See id.

Kroger, supra 219, at 1435-38.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable,76 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1093 (2001) (arguing that Bush lacked standing to raise the claims of Florida voters who
were denied equal protection by the counting of votes without standards); Karlan, supranote
268, at 85 (noting that Bush was an unlikely candidate to have third-party standing to
challenge the equal protection violation of the excluded voters). But see Tokaji, supra note
332

333
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solely upon the individualized views of five Justices who simply announced their
own disdain of recount procedures isolated from any goal of justice or fairness.
This unguided use of equity is what makes Bush v. Gore a dangerous precedent.
Even more interesting is that, for perhaps the first time, the two most ardent
critics of broader equitable relief, Justices Scalia and Thomas, readily join in an
unconstrained use of such equitable power. In the past, Justice Thomas has written
extensive concurring opinions in which he has articulated his view that judicial
equitable power does not extend to such broad relief... Thomas argued that the
"extravagant uses of judicial power" seen in the Court's desegregation cases and
other precedent "are at odds with the history and tradition of the equity power and
'
the Framers' design."335
He argued that equity must be constrained narrowly-by
precedent and principle as advocated by Blackstone and promised by the Founding
Fathers: "I believe that we must impose more precise standards and guidelines on
the federal equitable power, not only to restore predictability to the law and reduce
judicial discretion, but also to ensure that constitutional remedies are actually
336
targeted toward those who have been injured.
Justice Scalia has been more direct in his attacks on prophylactic relief in
particular.33 7 In Lewis v. Casey, he took the opportunity as the writer of the majority
opinion to hold that equitable remedies should be narrowly tailored to address only
the actual injury proven in the case. 3 A remedial limitation to only the actual
injury, rather than ancillary causes or effects of the legal injury, would seem to
exclude prophylactic measures.3 39 Indeed that is what Scalia has advocated,
resurrecting the academic criticisms discussed in this Article that prophylactic
remedies are inherently illegitimate and overly broad. 4 Yet both Justices in Bush
279 (arguing that problematic standing of Bush and Cheney representing disenfranchised
voters can be better explained by the liberal standing principles of First Amendment
jurisprudence).
331 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 364-65 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that the federal judiciary, since the time ofthe first desegregation cases, "has been exercising
'equitable' powers and issuing structural decrees entirely out of line with its constitutional
mandate"); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing
the Court's precedent that has permitted federal courts to exercise virtually unlimited
equitable powers to remedy desegregation because such authority tramples upon principles
of federalism and separation of powers and "has freed courts to pursue other agendas
unrelated to the narrow purpose of precisely remedying a constitutional harm").
...
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 126 (Thomas, J., concurring).
336 Id. at 133 (Thomas, J., concurring).
...See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,729 (2000); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 444 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
338 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348, 357.
339 Cf Thomas, supra note 68, at 723.
340 Hill, 530 U.S. at 749(arguing that prophylactic measures are inherently overbroad);
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that prophylactic measures are
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v. Gore are silent in their acceptance of the broad, untailored equitable relief and
readily endorse the Court's use of unconstrained equity power. The only
consistency between the vote of these Justices in Bush and their prior admonitions
of equity is the common result of barring, rather than facilitating, meaningful relief.
Thus, not only does Bush v. Gore exemplify the use of unfettered equitable
discretion to do harm, but it also represents a departure for at least two Justices
from strong principles seemingly rejecting such arbitrary judicial action.
CONCLUSION

Despite the attempt ofcommentators and the Court itself to discount the case,"'
the remedial decision in Bush v. Gore contains powerful precedent that can be used
as a weapon for a variety of arguments in the arenas of constitutional, remedial, and
election law. The decision can be used to support the use of broad prophylactic
relief for constitutional violations. It can be used to support an expansive use of
judicial remedial power and to counter legal criticisms from those like Justices
Scalia and Thomas against such broad relief It may even be used to invalidate the
U.S. Supreme Court's own remedial decisions. For example, in Costo v. United
States,3 42 the dissenting judge argued that the classification crafted by the U.S.
Supreme Court creating different tort remedies for military and civilian personnel
violated equal protection under the principles of Bush v. Gore.343 The Bush v. Gore
decision, standing as Supreme Court precedent on constitutional and remedial
issues, simply cannot be constrained to the isolated circumstances of the 2000
Election. Unlike the Queen in Alice's Wonderland, the Supreme Court cannot
simply announce that: "The rule is jam tomorrow, and jam yesterday - but never
344
jam today.

illegitimate judicial actions that violate separation of powers and federalism principles).
14' Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) ("Our consideration is limited to
the present circumstances, for the problem ofequal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities."); Tushnet, supra note 5 (recommending the case be ignored as
anomalous); Lund, supra note 3, at 1267 ("[T]here is something initially troubling about the
Bush v. Gore majority's narrow statement of its holding."); Nathaniel Hernandez, Trial
Lawyers And Profs Issue Split Opinion On FederalElection Ruling, 24 CHI. LAW. 8 (2001)
("I'm not sure the ruling sets any precedent because it might never happen again. It was such
a unique case that I don't think it will set any kind of precedent at all - it's all over, behind
us.") (quoting former federal judge Frank McGarr).
342 248 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001).
341 Id. at 869 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
344 CARROLL, supra note 1,at 174; see Krotoszynski, supranote 4, at 2092-93 (accusing
the Court in Bush v. Gore and other recent cases of adopting a "jurisprudence du jour" or
"jurisprudence of Oprah!" in which the personal feelings of individual Justices prevail over

any adherence to stare decisis).

